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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3{2X_b). 
ISSUES 
I. Did the trial court err in awarding petitioner alimony in an amount 
creating a disparate standard of living and contrary to the evidence regarding petitioner's 
need and respondent's ability to pay? [Issue preserved in R. 343-76; 416-87; 501-31; 540-
45; 546-57; 752-53; 764-65.] 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews the trial court's findings of fact in 
an award of alimony for abuse of discretion. Bakanowski v. Bakanowski. 2003 UT App 
357, [^7, 80 P.3d 153. '"Failure to consider these factors constitutes an abuse of 
discretion,' resulting in reversal 'unless pertinent facts in the record are clear, 
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor or judgment.'" Rehn v. 
Rehn, 1999 UT App 41, ^6, 974 P.2d 306. With respect to a trial court's conclusions of 
law. this Court reviews an alimony award for correctness, according no deference to the 
trial court. Davis v. Dayigr 2003 UT App 282f fl, 76 P.3d 716. 
II. Was the trial court's failure to follow Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 in 
making its alimony award in error? [Issue preserved in R. 343-76; 416-87; 501-31; 540-
45; 546-57; 752-53; 764-65-1 
Standard of Review: With respect to a trial court's conclusions of law, this 
Court reviews an alimony award for correctness, according no deference to the trial court. 
Davis v. Davis. 2003 UT App 282,1[7, 76 P.3d 716. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. 
ORDINANCES. RULES AND REGULATIONS 
(8)(a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requinng 
support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated 
by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the 
payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the 
payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
v* * * 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the 
time of separation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). 
However, the court should consider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in 
its discretion, base alimony on the standard of living that existed at the time of trial. . . . 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parites* 
respective standards of living. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8) (2003). 
*> 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is on appeal from a bench trial held in August of 2003. At trial, 
the parties introduced evidence on the issues of alimony and property distribution. Only 
the trial court's ruling with respect to alimony is part of this appeal. Following trial, the 
parties' submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The trial court 
entered a preliminary Memorandum Decision with its ruling based on the parties' 
submission. Thereafter, respondent filed post-trial motions for a new trial and to amend 
the findings. The trial court entered a subsequent written ruling, denying most of 
respondent's requested relief and adopting most of petitioner's proposed findings. 
Ultimately, a final set of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a 
final Decree of Divorce were entered. From the final decree, respondent timely appealed 
the trial court's alimony award. 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
// 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
The parties were married on May 15, 1979. (Tr. at 6.) On April 18, 2001, 
the parties separated when petitioner decided to leave the marital home in order to move 
to Washington to teach. Anna was 15 years old and Andrea was 19 years old and both 
were living at home with the respondent. (Tr. at 26, 117.) Shortly thereafter, petitioner 
filed for divorce on June 25, 2001. (Tr. at 26.) At the time of trial in August, 2003, 
respondent was 49 (d/o/b 12/11/53) and petitioner was 50 (d/o/b 7/23/53). (Tr. at 5.) The 
parties had two children, Andrea, 22, (d/o/b 11/13/80), and Anna, 17, (d/o/b 1/29/86) at 
the time of trial. (Tr. at 5-6.) At the time the parties separated, both children still lived at 
home (Tr. At 117); at the time of trial, the youngest, Anna, was entering her senior year of 
high school and expected to graduate in June, 2004 (Tr. at 7-9). During the marriage and 
after moving from the parties' home, petitioner's relationship with the children 
deteriorated, and respondent remained with the children in the marital home. 
'Respondent challenges the trial court's alimony determination on three grounds: 
(1) as a matter of law, (2) as unsupported by sufficient findings, and (3) as unsupported 
by evidence at tnal. In order to challenge the trial court's factual findings and insufficient 
findings, respondent must marshal the evidence at trial and the tnal court's factual 
findings. In order to fulfill this obligation, respondent has summarized the evidence at 
tnal that pertained to the alimony award with cites to the transcript, denoted by a cite 
beginning with "Tr.", whereas all cites to the record are denoted by "R." For the most 
part, however, respondent believes the alimony award is legal error for failure to comply 
with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 and case law interpreting those 
statutory requirements. 
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The parties met while working together at Schovaers Electronics in 1978. 
(Tr. at 11 ) Schovaers Electronics is family owned business which manufactures circuit 
boards for use in computers and electronic devices. The company was started by 
respondent's father in 1977. All stock is owned by members of the Schovaers family. (Tr. 
at 10-11.) At the time of marriage, respondent was Vice President of Schovaers 
Electronics and ran the manufacturing side of the business. (Tr. at 14.) At the time of 
trial, respondent was still Vice President. (Tr. at 16.) 
Throughout much of the marriage, respondent worked from 7:00 a.m. until 
about 5:00 p.m. at the family business For his work, respondent received a salary, (Tr. at 
16-17.) At the time of trial, respondent had worked at Schovaers Electronics for 26 years 
and often worked as many as 60 to 70 hours a week. (Tr. at 17, 119.) 
When the parties separated, the children remained with respondent in the 
marital home. Because petitioner no longer shared in the responsibilities of rasing the 
parties' children, respondent had to decrease his hours to 40-50 per week and was 
required to take a pay cut because of the decreased hours, (Tr. at 119-123.) Although 
one child was over 18 and the youngest child would reach the age of emancipation shortly 
after the trial in the fall of 2003, respondent did not believe he could return to the 60-70 
hour work week if he wanted to do so. Specifically, respondent testified that because of a 
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decrease in demand due to increased foreign competition, the family business did not 
have sufficient work to allow him to work 60-70 hours a week. (Tr. at 125.) 
The only testimony offered indicated Schovaers Electronics1 business has 
gone down. (Tr. at 122.) In 1999, Schovaer's Electronics lost $14,000. (Tr. at 123, Ex. 
49.) In 2000, the business lost $23,400. (Tr. at 124; Ex. 50.) In 2001, the business lost 
$20,500 (Tr. at 124; Ex. 51.) For the last half of 2002 and first 3 months of 2003, 
Schovaers Electronics has lost $7,900 (Ex. 52-53; Tr. at 124.) Additionally, respondent 
still spends significant amounts of time raising the children since petitioner moved to 
Washington in August pf 2002. (Tr. at 125.) 
Respondent's Income as Ability to Pay: 
Shortly before the parties' separation, respondent's salary from Schovaers 
Electronics peaked at approximately $5700 per month gross. (Tr. at 29-31.) After 
separation when respondent decreased his hours in order to raise the children, his salary 
decreased to $4,300 per month gross. (Tr. at 31-2, 67-68, 119-121; Ex. 41.) The testimony 
offered to support respondent's decrease in hours and corresponding reduction in pay was 
that his increased responsibilities at home were the cause, testimony which petitioner did 
not refute. (Tr. at 31-2, 67-68,119-121; Ex. 41.) Dunng the marriage, respondent 
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received only sporadic bonuses, with the largest bonus being received one month after the 
parties' marriage in 1979 for $30,000. (Tr. at 34-35.) 
In addition to the sporadic bonuses which were infrequently paid, 
respondent occasionally received gifts from his parents. (Tr. at 45.) The gifts to 
respondent were as high as $10,000, but most were substantially lower with a few for 
$5,000 (Tr. at 46) or as little as $500 (Tr. at 46). After separation and after respondent's 
salary had decreased, respondent received occasional gifts from parents. (Tr. at 46.) In 
December, 2002, respondent received Christmas gift of $5,000. (Tr. at 46; Ex. 43.) 
During the marriage, the parties'joint gross income figures for 1998 (Ex. 
36) and 1999 (Ex. 35), were $93,056 (Tr. at 52-53) and $98,830 (Tr. at 53); joint mcome 
for 2000 was $93,596 (Tr. at 53), From 1998 through separation, the combined income 
was roughly $94,000 per year (Tr. at 56.) Prior to that time, the parties' combined 
income was lower. (Tr. at 56 ) 
In 2001, the parties filed separately and respondent's income was $57,077. 
(Tr. at 54.) In 2002 (Ex. 38), respondent's income was 70,000. (Tr. at 56.) At the time of 
trial, respondent's salary was $51,600, or $4,300 gross per month with no anticipated 
increase (Tr. at 172); his net income after taxes was $3,400 (Tr. at 172; Ex. 23). 
Respondent receives a net check of $1,700 twice per month. (Tr. at 173; Ex. 25.) 
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Petitioner's Tncome: 
Prior to the parties1 marriage in 1979, petitioner worked at Schovaers 
Electronics as a silk screener. (Tr. at 108.) She also worked at Schmidt Signs as a silk-
screener. (Tr. at 110.) About 9 months after marriage, petitioner stopped working at 
Schovaers Electronics by mutual agreement. (Tr. at 108-09.) Petitioner was pregnant and 
the parties' first child was born in November, 1980. (Tr. at 109-10.) Between 1980 and 
1997, petitioner did not work and stayed at home to care for the parties1 children. (Tr. at 
111.) 
In about 1991, petitioner decided to go back to school and she used 
inherited money and marital assets to pay for college. (Tr. at 112, 208.) Petitioner 
obtained a teaching certificate from Westminster College. (Tr. at 112.) Petitioner started 
working for Granite School District in January, 199S (Tr. at 113) and then went to Jordan 
School District after one year at Granite (Tr. at 113, 208-9). Petitioner worked full time 
initially, but was offered history classes rather than the art classes she wanted to teach, so 
she switched to part-time at Jordan. (Tr. at 113-114,209-11.) 
With respect to the decision to teach part time, petitioner voluntarily 
stopped teaching history because she only wanted to teach art classes at Jordan. (Tr. at 
270-274.) Shortly before the parties separated, petitioner voluntarily resigned from 
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teaching at Jordan. (Tr. at 274-75.) Additionally, petitioner sent a letter to the Jordan 
district withdrawing her name from any future teaching positions, indicating she could not 
accept a position in the school district because she was moving to Washington. (Tr. at 
275-280.) 
In Washington, petitioner works 25 hours per week at the Bon Marche* (a 
permanent position) and also as a substitute teacher at Everett School District. (Tr. at 
214.) At the Bon Marche\ petitioner receives $11/hour and works about 25 hours a week, 
which equals about $1,188 per month. (Tr. at 215, Ex. 85.) Since the beginning of 2003 
through trial in August, 2003, petitioner substitute taught 7-8 times, for which she 
received $1,035, or about $130 monthly. (Tr. at 217-19; Ex. 87.) Since moving to 
Washington, petitioner has applied to various school districts, but has not received any 
teaching offers. (Tr. at 222-227.) Also, petitioner has applied for other jobs, but has 
received no offers. Her current salary, combining her work at the Bon Marche' and 
substitute teaching, is $1,310 per month. (Tr. at 227-30.) Although petitioner has not 
found the teaching positions she hoped for in Washington, she is not considering moving 
back to Utah, even though the job prospects in Washington are bleak. (Tr. at 280-81.) 
In 1999, petitioners income was $20,000 (Tr. at 54); and in 2000, her 
income was $14,000 (Tr. at 54-55). At Jordan district, petitioner received $24,022 in 
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2001 (Tr. at 220; Ex. 81); in 2002, she received $18,525 (Tr. at 220; Ex. 82). Petitionees 
income in 2002 was from both part-time teaching and working at the Bon and May stores. 
(Tr. at220.) 
Had petitioner remained in Utah and remained at Jordan school district she 
could have earned at least $28,000 per year; the Jordan district pay scale of teachers who 
have been teaching for five years is $28,000. (Tr. at 282; Ex. 99.) Although petitioner 
testified she did not like teaching history and was not certified to teach history, petitioner 
acknowledged she could accept a position teaching history as long as she took concurrent 
classes to get the required endorsement. (Tr. at 293-95.) 
Respondent's Monthly Expenses: 
With respect to respondent's monthly expenses, most of the figures were 
offered in the form of exhibits introduced at trial. (Tr. at 174, 185-90; Exs. 26, 91.) 
Exhibit 26 was the summary prepared by respondent, whereas exhibit 91 was a summary 
of respondent's expenses prepared by petitioner. (Tr, at 174, 185-90; Exs. 26, 91.) 
Ultimately, the trial court lowered several of Respondent's claimed expenses as excessive 
and determined his reasonable monthly expenses were $2,187 per month. (R. at 336-337; 
745-47; 807-810.) 
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Petitioner's Needs and Monthly Expenses: 
During trial, the testimony regarding petitioner's expenses focused mainly 
on her standard of living after separation as compared to during the marriage. (Tr. at 259-
66.) Much of this testimony, however, was inadmissible. (Tr. at 262-64.) Petitioner 
requested alimony to match the standard of living enjoyed during marriage, which she 
estimated required $2500 per month. (Tr. at 259-66.) Similar to respondent's testimony, 
most of petitioner's testimony regarding her monthly expenses occurred through exhibits. 
(Tr. at 230, 287-90, Exs. 34, 98.) Exhibit 98 was petitioner's prepared summary of her 
expenses and exhibit 34 was an earlier financial declaration. (Tr. at 230, 287-290; Exs. 
34, 98.) Ultimately, the trial court adopted petitioner's exhibit 98 as reflective of her 
reasonable monthly expenses. (R. at 805.) 
Schovaers Electronics Stock: 
At the time of trial, respondent owned 116 shares of Schovaers Electronics 
stock. (Tr. at 62.) Respondent received these shares as gifts from his parents over a ten 
year period (Tr. at 63; Ex. 47-48.) The stock was gifted at six different dates, with his 
parents fixing values to the stock at each date. (Tr. at 64, Ex. 47-48.) The first gift was for 
35 shares, valued at $16,873 per share as of March, 1985. (Tr. at 68.) On September 30, 
1988, respondent received another 34 shares, valued at the time at $584 per share. (Tr. at 
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69.) On December 16, 1991, respondent received another 13 shares, valued at $1,491 per 
share. (Tr. at 69.) In April, 1992, respondent acquired another 13 shares, valued at $1,503 
per share. (Tr. at 69.) On October 15, 1993, respondent received 12 shares, valued at 
$1,663 per share, and on December 22, 1995, he received 9 shares, valued at $2,124 per 
share. (Tr. at 70.) Currently, respondent owns 116 shares (Tr. at 73) or 11.6 percent of 
Schovaers Electronics (Tr. at 71, 144-45). 
John has five siblings (Tr. at 71-2): Bob who also ownsl 16 shares (Tr. at 
73), Mary Jane who owns 40 shares (Tr. at 73), Susan who owns 40 shares (Tr. at 74), 
Judy who owns 116 shares (Tr. at 73), and Barabara who owns 48 shares (Tr. at 73). 
When the shares were gifted from the parents to the children, the parents made no 
indication that the shares were a form of compensation or tied to employment. (Tr. at 74.) 
During trial, respondent objected to petitioner's attempt to fix values to the 
shares, which objection was sustained by the trial court. (Tr. at 68.) Specifically, 
petitioner attempted to elicit testimony fixing the value of respondent's 116 shares at least 
to $2124 per share. Respondent objected to this attempt to value the shares and the 
objection was sustained. (Tr. at 79, 80 ) Respondent testified the shares were not a marital 
asset and indicated he had an expert to testify as to the value of the stock. (Tr. at 80-83.) 
The trial court indicated that, absent other foundation and testimony that the shares were a 
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marital asset, it did not need any further evidence as to value because the stock was not a 
marital asset which needed to be valued. (Tr. at 82-83.) Although petitioner testified that 
she believed the value of the stock was $800,000 and that she owned an interest, the trial 
court never requested further testimony as to the present value of the shares, nor was any 
evidence as to present value offered. (Tr. at 68, 79-83, 239-241, 247-48.) Finally, no 
testimony was offered that the shares had any capacity to produce income. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred in awarding 
petitioner alimony of $2,000 per month. The trial court's award was motivated by its 
perception that the parties' post-separation lifestyles were skewed in respondent's favor. 
Accordingly, the trial court awarded alimony m an attempt to "equalize" the parties' 
standards of living. As the rulings and evidence indicate, however, the alimony award 
was excessive and not based on the evidence presented. Thus, the result was to provide 
petitioner far more income than she needed to meet her monthly expenses and to cause 
respondent to be unable to meet his expenses. 
The undisputed facts indicate respondent's take home pay is $3,400 per 
month. Indeed, the trial court specifically rejected petitioner's attempt to use a higher 
historical income figure. Nevertheless, the trial court ordered respondent to pay well over 
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half of his take home pay as alimony. The result is that respondent is left with $1,400 per 
month to meet his living expenses, which the court lowered to $2,187. Meanwhile, 
petitioner receives far more than her demonstrated need. As such, the alimony award is 
an abuse of discretion and should be reversed on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court Erred in Awarding Petitioner Alimony of $2000 Per 
Month Where the Award Is Not Supported By Adequate Findings, Is 
Not Supported By Evidence and Is Not Legally Correct. 
A. The Trial Court Did Not Make Adequate Findings. 
The trial court's findings are inconsistent with the evidence presented at trial 
and are insufficient to support an alimony award of $2000 per month. The trial court 
made the following findings: the trial court determined respondent's gross monthly 
income is $4,300 per month (R. at 333, 746, 794, f 19); at the time of trial, petitioner's 
gross monthly income was $1,380.00 per month (R. at 745, 795, f24) and the court 
imputed income to her of $1,649.00 per month (R. at 745, 796, |30); the trial court 
lowered respondent's claimed monthly expenses to $2,189.00 per month (R. at 807-10, 
ffl|96-97), and finally, the trial court made no findings as to petitioner's reasonable 
monthly expenses, except to adopt by reference an exhibit with her claimed monthly 
expenses (R. at 791-813). 
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In making an alimony award, the trial court is required to make findings for 
each of the statutory factors set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5; i.e., the needs of the 
recipient spouse; the earning capacity of the recipient spouse; the ability of the obligor 
spouse to provide support; and, the length of the marriage. See Rehn v. Rehn, 1999 UT 
App 41, 1(6, 974 P.2d 306. The failure to make these findings constitutes an abuse of 
discretion and is reversible error. Simply making these findings, however, is not 
necessarily sufficient. "[T]he tnal court must make detailed findings on all material 
issues, i.e. the Jones|2] factors, which 'should . . . include enough subsidiary facts to 
disclose the steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was reached.'" 
Id (quoting Stevens v. Stevens. 754 P.2d 952, 958 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)). Respondent 
challenges the trial court's determinations regarding his ability to pay and petitioner's 
need. 
i. Respondent's Ability to Pay, 
As to Respondent's ability to pay, the trial court is required to make specific 
findings: "'simply stating [the obligor's] earnings does not amount to an adequate finding 
of fact as to his ability to provide support. To be sufficient, the findings should also 
2Jones v. Jones. 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). 
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address [the obligor's] needs and expenditures, such as housing, payment of debts, and 
other living expenses/" Rehn, 1999 UT App 41 at ^ [10 (quoting Baker, 866 P.2d at 547). 
The fatal flaw in the trial court's determination of respondent's ability to 
pay can be traced through the trial court's post-trial rulings which culminated in the final 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The only issue as to respondent's income 
concerned his voluntary reduction in hours and corresponding decrease in pay. During 
the trial, respondent was questioned regarding the reduction in his hours after the parties' 
separation. (Tr. at pp. 17, 119-123, 125, 205-06.) Although petitioner presented 
evidence that respondent's hours worked and income decreased at the time of separation, 
the credible evidence presented justified respondent's decreased hours. Specifically, 
respondent's work time decreased from between 60-7u hours per week to approximately 
40-50 hours per week by necessity. (Tr. at pp. 17, 119-123, 125, 205-06.) Petitioner had 
traditionally cared for the parties' children, but at separation, petitioner voluntarily moved 
out of the marital home, stopped caring for the parties' children and indicated she was 
moving to Washington. (Tr. at 117, 119-23, 277-81.) Consequently, respondent was 
forced to decrease his hours in order to provide care for the children. (Tr. at 119-23.) 
Additionally, since separation, respondent offered unrefuted testimony that 
his family's electronic business had experienced a downturn in demand. (Tr. at 119-23, 
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125.) Even if respondent did not have to decrease his hours to care for the children, the 
evidence indicated the family electronic business did not have enough work to sustain 
respondent at the same workload as during the marriage. (Tr. at 119-23, 125.) 
After trial, the court ordered both parties to submit proposed findings for 
the court's consideration. Petitioner submitted her proposed findings and included 
findings which indicated respondent was voluntarily underemployed. (R. at 334.) In the 
first post-trial Memorandum Decision dated October 31, 2003, the trial court rejected 
petitioner's findings which suggested respondent was underemployed. (R. at 334.) 
Specifically, the trial court stated: 
The petitioner is to amend Finding of Fact No. 20 and 
delete Finding No. 21 to reflect that the respondent's pay was 
reduced from approximately $6,000 per month to $4,300 per 
month (gross) because of a reduction in work hours 
necessitated by his having to assume all of the parenting and 
household responsibilities. In other words, both Findings 
imply that the respondent was earning less than he was 
capable of. The testimony does not bear this out and the 
Court makes no such Findings. 
(R at 334, f 1 (Emphasis Added.)) Accordingly, the trial court unequivocally found that 
respondent was not underemployed. Thus, the trial court's alimony award was based on 
respondent's current income of $4,300 gross per month. (R. at 794, TJ19.) After taxes, 
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respondent's net take home pay is $3,400 per month. Once the alimony obligation is 
deducted, respondent is left with only $1,400 to meet his monthly expenses. 
The second component of respondent's ability to pay requires consideration 
of respondent's own monthly expenses. In reviewing respondent's claimed expenses, the 
tnal court substantially lowered respondent's claimed expenses and found his reasonable 
monthly expenses were $2,189. Accordingly, after paying his alimony obligation, 
respondent is left with a monthly shortfall of almost $800. In contrast, petitioner receives 
$2,000 per month plus her actual earned income of $1,380 (notwithstanding the fact that 
the trial court imputed income of $ 1,649 per month) Thus, petitioner has $3,3 80 per 
month to live on3, and respondent has $1,400. The tnal court's alimony award does not 
equalize the parties income, but rather results in a major discrepancy in petitioner's favor. 
As such, the trial court's alimony award was in error and an abuse of discretion. 
Respondent did not decrease his hours to an unreasonably low amount, nor 
did his compensation decrease to unusually low level. The Utah Supreme Court has 
previously determined that a spouse whose hours decreased to 50 hours per week and 
who was still adequately compensated by the family business was not voluntarily 
3Of course, the $3,380 is a gross figure. Nevertheless, after taxes are taken out, 
petitioner's net take home is about double what respondent has to live on after he pays 
alimony. 
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underemployed. See Griffith v. Griffith. 1999 UT 78, f l8 , 985 P.2d 255. Additionally, 
this Court previously found a husband's decision to stop working in order to care for the 
children and because of age related issues was reasonable and not grounds for a 
determination of voluntary underemployment. See Endrody v. Endrody, 914 P.2d 1166, 
1170 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Moreover, the trial court found respondent's testimony 
credible on the reduction in pay and declined petitioner's invitation to base alimony on 
respondent's historic income. (R. at 334.) Absent the required findings and considering 
the evidence presented at trial to support respondent's decision to decrease his hours from 
60-70 to 40-50 hours per week, no basis exists to conclude respondent is voluntarily 
underemployed or could receive more compensation for his work even if he decided to 
return to 60-70 hours per week. 
Although respondent decreased his hours at work after the parties separated, 
it is undisputed respondent continues to maintain full time employment of approximately 
40 to 50 hours per week. (Tr. at pp. 17, 119-123, 125, 205-06.) With the 10 to 20 hour a 
week decrease, respondent's income decreased from approximately $72,000 per year to 
$51,600 at the time of trial. (R. at 794-95, ffl|19, 21.) After taxes, respondents net take 
home pay is $3,400. (Tr. at 172-73; Ex. 23, 25.) From that $3,400, the trial court ordered 
respondent to pay $2000 per month in order to "equalize" incomes. The trial court's 
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alimony order has the effect of leaving respondent $1,400 per month to live on, while 
petitioner receives $3,380 per month in gross income ($2,000 + $1,380 (actual income, 
not imputed income) = $3,380). Even after taxes are figured into petitioner's income, 
petitioner's net monthly income is substantially higher than respondent's. After factoring 
in petitioner's claimed monthly expenses of $1743 and taxes, petitioner is left with 
approximately $1,000 per month in discretionary income. On the other hand, respondent 
is left with an $800 shortfall. 
The trial court's alimony award is based on respondent's gross take home 
pay of $4,300 per month. After taxes and alimony, respondent does not have enough 
money to meet his basic monthly expenses. An alimony award which fails to account for 
respondent's ability to pay is an abuse of discretion and fails as a matter of law. Because 
the trial court ordered respondent to pay more than he could afford, the alimony award 
cannot be sustained as a matter of law. 
ii. Petitioner's Need. 
The trial court abused its discretion by failing to make any detailed findings 
as to petitioner's actual need for alimony to meet her monthly expenses. Addressing need, 
this Court has stated: "As to the first factor, we stated in Baker that a trial court may not 
"merely restate [the recipient spouse's] testimony [regarding] her monthly 
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expenses '" Rehn, 1999 UT App 41 at f 7 (quoting Baker v. Baker. 866 P.2d 540, 546 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993)). In other words, Rehn, Baker and Stevens require the trial court to 
independently assess petitioner's stated expenses, evaluate them in light of the evidence 
produced, make detailed factual findings which disclose the trial court's consideration of 
the evidence and the steps used to reach the findings and to set forth the findings without 
simply restating petitioner's testimony. As the evidence and findings indicate, the trial 
court failed to meet this standard. Specifically, the trial court violated the mandate in 
Rehn by making no independent findings and merely adopting wholesale petitioner's 
stated need. 
The trial court made no specific findings as to petitioner's actual needs. 
Instead, the trial court made the following observations: (1) since separation, petitioner 
has not been able to maintain the standard of living the parties enjoyed while married; (2) 
since separation, petitioner has lived a "spartan" existence; and (3) since separation, 
petitioner has had to cut back on her discretionary spending. (R. at 805-06, ffl[89-93.) 
These general observations are not sufficient to replace the specific findings required by 
Utah law. 
When coupled with the trial court's erroneous determination of respondent's 
ability to pay, the trial court's deficient findings as to petitioner's need result in an 
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unsupportable alimony award. In this case, the trial court made no findings as to what 
petitionees actual demonstrated need is. The only finding which remotely addresses 
petitionees expenses is paragraph 90, which provides: MThe amounts that Ms. Schovaers 
current [sic] claims to be spending for basic necessary living expenses are set forth in 
Exhibit #98." (R at 805, f90.) Exhibit #98 lists petitioner's monthly expenses as $1,743 
per month. Instead of a specific finding, the trial court made general observations that 
petitioner needed alimony in order to raise her standard of living to a level comparable to 
that of respondent's. Those findings, however, are insufficient. As Utah law indicates, 
the trial court needed to make an actual determination of petitioner's unmet need for 
purposes of calculating an appropriate award. Without this finding, the alimony award 
provides petitioner income well in excess of her actual need while causing the respondent 
at least an $800 shortfall. 
With respect to the substantial alimony award, the trial court's award 
appears to be premised on equalizing income and restoring petitioner to the standard of 
living she enjoyed while the parties were married. The trial court's early rulings were all 
based on the perception that respondent enjoyed a supenor lifestyle and petitioner's 
lifestyle was meager. (R. at 336-37, 745-47.) The trial court's post trial rulings and 
ultimate Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, however, fail to articulate what 
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petitioner's actual expenses and/or need is for alimony. (R. at 333-339, 742-4Q,791-
821A.) 
Based on the only findings made by the trial court as to petitioner's 
expenses compared with her income, the petitioner's unmet need would be $1,743 -
$1,649 (imputed income) = $94. If petitioner's actual monthly income is used, rather than 
the imputed income, her unmet need is still only $363 per month ($1,743 - $1,380). 
Either figure is a far cry from the $2,000 alimony award made by the trial court. 
It is undisputed that the parties' income since separation has decreased-by 
virtue of petitioner's voluntary underemployment and respondent's decrease in income as 
a result of caring for the parties' children and slow down in his family's business-while 
the parties' expenses have increased by virtue of the necessity of maintaining two 
residences. The testimony indicates that at its height during the marriage the parties' joint 
income did not exceed $92,000.00 gross per year. (R. at 795-96, 804,1fl(21, 27, 86.) With 
the alimony award and imputed mcome, petitioner's gross income is approximately half of 
the parties1 highest yearly income during the marriage, which is $46,000. (R. at 811, 
Tfl06.) The evidence and findings demonstrate that the parties no longer earn $92,000 per 
year, nor are they capable of earning that amount. In fact, not taking into account the 
income imputed to petitioner, the parties current joint income is $68,160 ($51,600 + 
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$16,560 = $68,160). Accordingly, with the alimony award, petitioner receives roughly 
2/3 of the parties' combined gross income. (R. at 811.) 
Notwithstanding the trial court's attempt to equalize income, the trial court 
made no findings as to petitioner's actual need as required by Utah Code Ann § 30-3-5. 
As set forth above, the trial court only made findings as to the parties' standard of living 
during the marriage. This is not sufficient. Moreover, these findings are especially 
deficient in this case where the parties' historic income levels do not support an equalized 
alimony award. Equalization is typically appropriate in cases where the payor spouse's 
income is substantially higher than the recipient spouse's income and also substantially 
higher than the payor spouse's need. In that circumstance where the payor spouse has 
substantial discretionary income, it may be appropriate to equalize the parties' income to 
lessen the disparity and provide lifestyles more consistent with that dunng the parties' 
marriage. 
The evidence in this case does not support an award of alimony to equalize 
the parties' income. Although the parties enjoyed a comfortable lifestyle during marriage, 
it cannot be said that the parties had substantial amounts of discretionary income. After 
separation, both parties' incomes decreased while the parties' combined expenses 
increased. Quite simply, neither party is able to enjoy the standard of living they had 
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during the marriage. An alimony award based on no findings as to the recipient spouse's 
actual need is not appropriate. Because the trial court did not make the required finding 
of petitionees actual need, the alimony award is an abuse of discretion and reversible 
error as a matter of law. 
Hi. Income from Other Sources. 
Finally, the trial court made no findings to support a conclusion that 
respondent had income from other sources which would assist in his ability to pay. (R. at 
810.) The trial court made a finding which indicated that it was awarding respondent all 
of the stock in the family's electronics business as his separate property. (R. at SOL K1f56-
57.) The trial court, however, made no findings as to how this stock would supplement 
respondent's income. (R. at 747, 800-01, 810.) Indeed, no evidence was presented to 
suggest the shares produced any income or dividend. (Tr. at 63-74, 80-83, 239-41, 247-
284.) In fact, no evidence was presented as to the actual value of the shares. (Tr. at 79-
83.) Petitioner did introduce evidence as to the value respondent's parents fixed to the 
shares at various points in time, but that evidence was inadmissible. (Tr. at 79-83.) 
Petitioner, however, offered no evidence to show a current value for the shares. (Tr. at 
79-83 ) 
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On the other hand, Respondent offered testimony and argument which 
indicated the value of the shares was minimal. (Tr. at 79-83, 239-41, 247-48 ) Indeed, 
respondent offered to provide expert testimony regarding the value of the shares. The 
trial court, however, declined this invitation because she indicated she was inclined to 
rule the stock was not a marital asset. (Tr. at 79-83.) In the Findings of Fact, the trial 
court's only statement on income from the shares of stock is as follows: "Furthermore, 
Mr. Schovaers* ability to pay alimony of at least $2,000 per month is bolstered by the fact 
that the Court is awarding Mr. Schovaers all of the Schovaers Electronics stock which is 
worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. Thus, Mr. Shovaers clearly has the financial 
ability and resources to pay alimony of a least $2,000 per month." (R. at 810, ^ f 100.) 
This unsupported factual finding is simply an insufficient basis upon which 
to determine respondent has additional income to pay alimony. The stock is issued from a 
closely held family business. The stock has little value to persons outside the family and 
is, by the terms of the gift from the parents, non-transferable. Furthermore, the stock has 
never paid a dividend or generated any income stream. 
In addition to not generating any income, an alimony award premised on the 
use or sale of a non-marital asset is inappropnate. In certain circumstances, alimony may 
be enhanced because the obligor spouse is awarded an asset which enhances the spouse's 
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earning capacity. See, e.g., Sorensen v. Sorensen, 839 P.2d 774, 776 (Utah 1992) 
(finding husband's dental practice was not a marital asset but noting the alimony award 
was enhanced due to the amount husband earned as income from the practice); see also 
Petersen v. Petersen. 737 P.2d 237, 242 (Utah Ct. App. 1^87). In those cases, however, 
the asset enhances the obligor spouse's income and therefore increases the spouse's ability 
to pay. In this case, the asset does nothing to enhance respondent's income. To the extent 
the alimony award contemplates he could sell the stock to pay alimony, the award is 
legally flawed because no Utah case has held a spouse should sell a non-marital asset in 
order to pay alimony, which is not otherwise sustainable based on that spouse's actual 
earning capacity. In effect, an alimony award premised on sale of an asset would be a 
property distribution rather than alimony. Since the court has determined the stock is not 
a marital asset, the backdoor property distribution through heightened alimony amounts to 
legal error. 
B. Given the Lack of Findings to Support the Award and Flawed 
Reasoning, the Trial Court Erred When It Arrhed at an Award 
Which Created a Disparate Standard of Living. 
The tnal court committed legal error when it awarded petitioner alimony of 
$2000 per month when respondent has no ability to pay this amount and petitioner has no 
demonstrated need for this amount. In this case, the tnal court appeared to simply attempt 
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to equalize the parties1 incomes, which it ultimately failed to do. The failure of the trial 
court to consider the statutory factors and instead to equalize income was error. See 
Bakanowski v. Bakanowski. 2003 UT App 357,^[12, 80 P.3d 153. Indeed this Court has 
indicated a trial court should not award a spouse more than her established need 
"regardless of the [payor spouse's] ability to pay" that amount, and "the spouse's 
demonstrated need must, under Jones, constitute the maximum permissible alimony 
award." Id. 
For the reasons set forth above, the trial court's alimony award is legally 
flawed in failing to consider the required statutory factors. Additionally, assuming the 
statutory factors were considered and the findings sufficient, the award cannot be 
sustained because it legally incorrect. The alimony award creates a large discrepancy in 
the parties1 incomes and creates a circumstance where respondent cannot meet his basic 
monthly expenses. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing facts and authorities, respondent respectfully 
requests this Court reverse the trial court's alimony award and enter an Order granting 
such other and further relief as the Court deems appropnate. Respondent acknowledges 
that appropriate relief in this instance may be a remand to the trial court with instructions 
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to enter an appropriate alimony award based upon sufficient findings, which may require 
the tnal court to receive new evidence. 
DATED this " 7 day of , 2005 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
/ \ ttAti~~--
MICHAEL K. MOHRMAN 
ZACHARY E. PETERSON 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
FL J DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
OCT 3 1 2 0 0 3 
SALT \Jti£ COUNTY 
By- / *r— 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPHINE M. SCHOVAERS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JOHN C* SCHOVAERS, 
Respondent• 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 014903735 
This matter came before the Court for a bench trial which 
concluded on August 26, 2003. At the conclusion of counsels' 
closing arguments, the Court asked the respective counsel to submit 
their proposed versions of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. The Court then took the matter under advisement. The 
petitioner filed her proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law on approximately September 16, 2003. The respondent submitted 
his proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
approximately September 30, 2003. The Court has carefully 
considered these proposed Findings, together with the pleadings 
that have been filed in this matter, the testimony that was adduced 
at trial, the trial exhibits that were received into evidence and 
counsels1 arguments. Being now fully advised, the Court rules as 
herein stated. 
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LEGAL ANALYSIS 
As the Court mentioned above, both sides submitted their 
proposed versions of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
After carefully reviewing each of these, the Court concludes that 
the petitioner's version more closely comports with the rulings 
that the Court made during the trial and the rulings that the Court 
will make herein. The Court generally adopts the petitioner's 
Findings and Conclusions, with the addition of the following 
rulings and amendments: 
1. The petitioner is to amend Finding of Fact No. 20 and 
delete Finding No. 21 to reflect that the respondent's pay was 
reduced from approximately $6,000 per month to $4,300 per month 
(gross) because of a reduction in work hours necessitated by his 
having to assume all of the parenting and household 
responsibilities. In other words, both Findings imply that the 
respondent was earning less than he was capable of. The testimony 
does not bear this out and the Court makes no such findings. 
2. The petitioner discusses the parties' house and real 
property at 1888 Spring Lane, Salt Lake City, Utah, in Finding Nos. 
33 through 41. The petitioner is to re-draft these Findings first 
to simplify them and second, to incorporate paragraph 5 (a) of the 
respondent's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The 
Court concludes that the respondent's version in this respect is 
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the more accurate version of the Court's ruling on the house and 
the division of the proceeds upon the sale of the house. The 
Conclusions of Law should similarly be edited, 
3. At Finding Nos. 46 to 60, the petitioner discusses the 
respondent!s stock in Schovaers Electronics. The Court rules in 
favor of the respondent on the issue of whether this stock 
constitutes employment compensation or a gift from the respondent's 
family. Based on the totality of evidence before it, the Court 
concludes that the stock was not intended to be a marital asset, 
but rather a discrete gift to the respondent from his family. In 
reaching this decision, the Court particularly focused on the fact 
that all of the stock was gifted strictly to the respondent and 
there was no commingling of this stock with the remaining marital 
assets. Accordingly, the petitioner is to re-draft her proposed 
Findings and Conclusions to reflect this ruling. 
4. At Finding Nos. 61 through 64, the petitioner discusses 
the division of the parties1 vehicles. The Court now rules that 
there is to be an adjustment of value in the vehicles (i.e. between 
the $11,175 value of the Jeep which the petitioner has been awarded 
and the $1,500 Ford truck that the respondent has been awarded). 
The petitioner is to incorporate this ruling into the 
aforementioned Findings. The Conclusions of Law should similarly 
be edited. 
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5. Beginning at Finding No. 71, the petitioner sets forth 
the findings which provide the basis for an award of alimony. The 
Court adopts these Findings in full, with the addition that this is 
a classic case where alimony should be awarded. This is a marriage 
that is long in duration and wherein the partiesf respective 
incomes are greatly disparate. Credible evidence was presented to 
the Court that the petitioner agreed to forego employment and 
educational opportunities for the purpose of staying at home to 
raise the parties1 children and to facilitate or enable the 
respondent's ability to work, extensive hours at his family!s 
business. The result was that the respondent was able to dedicate 
himself to that business and earn a salary which provided a "high-
end11 lifestyle for the parties and their children. In sharp 
contrast to this lifestyle, the petitioner now lives in what can 
only be described as a meager existence. By her own account, the 
petitioner's standard of living has significantly diminished. 
Clearly, the petitioner has unmet financial needs and the 
respondent has a demonstrated ability to assist her in terms of 
paying her alimony. In evaluating the respondents ability, the 
Court particularly focused on the fact that the respondent greatly 
inflated his claimed expenses., Therefore, after evaluating the 
parties1 total financial picture and taking into account their 
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respective income levels in light of their reasonable expenses and 
the lifestyle enjoyed during the marriage, the Court determines 
that alimony is properly set at $2,000 per month. 
1. The petitioner is to re-draft her proposed Findings and 
Conclusions to reflect this ruling. 
2. The petitioner is to delete Finding No. 103 because the 
Court does not find that the respondent has the financial ability 
to pay $3,000 per month. Instead, the Court adopts the analysis of 
Finding No. 106, which appropriately finds that alimony in the 
amount of $2,000 would raise the petitioner's standard of living to 
approximately what she enjoyed during the parties1 marriage. 
3. The Court is unclear on how the petitioner arrived at her 
figures in Conclusion Nos. 25 and 26. The Courtfs notes indicate 
that together with the Court, the parties1 calculated that the 
petitioner was entitled to $12,549.50 out of the parties1 Bank and 
Investment Accounts. The petitioner is to correct her figures to 
reflect the amounts discussed at the conclusion of trial in 
reaching the figure of $12,549. 
Counsel for the petitioner is to submit an amended version of 
the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Divorce Decree 
which comport with this Memorandum Decision. While the Court 
believes that this Memorandum Decision resolves all of the issues 
taken under advisement by the Court, if there remain any 
13* 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this "3/ day of 
October, 2003: 
Frank N. Call 
Attorney for Petitioner 
68 S. Main, Suite 701 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
B. L. Dart 
Attorney for Respondent 
370 E. South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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APR 2 0 2001 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
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 V * Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPHINE M. SCHOVAERS, : COURT'S RULING 
Petitioner, : CASE NO. 014903735 
vs. : 
JOHN C. SCHOVAERS, 
Respondent. : 
This matter comes before the Court in connection with the 
respondent's dual Notices to Submit seeking rulings on (1) the 
respondent's Rule 52(b) Motion to Amend Findings and Rule 59(a) 
Motion for New Trial and Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter or Amend 
Judgment; (2) the petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact and 
Proposed Decree of Divorce; and (3) the respondent's Objections to 
Petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
dated January 7, 2004. The Court notes that there is also a 
pending Motion for Relief from Entry of Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce Pursuant to Rule 60(b) (6) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. While this Motion has not 
been fully briefed, the Court will discuss the merit of the same 
herein. Further, the Court notes that the parties have requested 
oral argument on the foregoing matters. At this juncture, the 
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Court is not inclined to grant a hearing because the parties' 
written submissions adequately detail their respective positions. 
Therefore, the request for hearing is denied. 
At the outset, the Court notes that after issuing its 
Memorandum Decision on October 31, 2 003, the procedural posture of 
this matter unfortunately became increasingly convoluted, 
crescendoing with the recently filed Motion for Relief. In order 
to address both the procedural and substantive matters raised by 
the various pending Motions, Objections, and proposed Findings, 
Conclusions and Decrees, the Court again carefully reviewed the 
file in this matter (in its entirety), the relevant exhibits that 
were accepted into evidence at trial, the Court's own notes on the 
trial testimony and counsels' arguments and the transcript of the 
closing arguments, which counsel graciously provided to the Court. 
Having done so, the Court addresses each of the pending Motions and 
Objections in turn. 
The Court begins with the respondent's Motion to Amend and for 
New Trial and to Alter or Amend Judgment. First, the respondent 
raises the concern that the Court issued its Memorandum Decision 
without having considered his Proposed Findings and Conclusions. 
To be clear, as the Court: specifically indicated in the initial 
paragraph of its Memorandum Decision, both sides' proposed Findings 
and Conclusions were carefully considered by the Court. Further, 
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while there appears to be a discrepancy in the filing date of the 
respondent's Proposed Findings and Conclusions (i.e. September 30, 
2003, rather than September 16, 2003 , when they were actually 
submitted) , the Court has no doubt that they were in fact 
considered. 
In addition, the respondent places much emphasis on the 
Court's inadvertent reference to paragraph 5(a) of the respondent's 
Proposed Findings and Conclusions. As the respondent astutely 
notes, the Court was intending to incorporate paragraph 5(a) of the 
respondent's proposed Decree of Divorce, instead of the proposed 
Findings and Conclusions. However, this error should not in any 
way be interpreted to suggest that the Court did not have the 
respondent's proposed Findings and Conclusions and that she was 
relying only on the respondent's proposed Decree of Divorce. To 
reiterate, both sides' proposed Findings and Conclusions were 
thoroughly considered. 
Having made this clarification, the Court proceeds to address 
the respondent's arguments that the Court erred in its analysis 
relating to the issue of petitioner's alimony and in setting the 
appropriate amount of child support. With respect to alimony, the 
respondent maintains that the Court should not have awarded the 
petitioner any alimony despite the clear indication (which the 
Court articulated both during the trial and in its Memorandum 
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Decision) that this was a "classic alimony" case. The Court 
concludes that the respondent's position is both legally and 
factually flawed. 
First, the respondent takes issue with the Court's finding 
that the petitioner has a gross monthly income from all employment 
of $1,380 per month. To clarify, the Court's alimony analysis was 
not based on this figure. Rather, the Court focused on the 
historic income information for the petitioner, found in Exhibit 
89, which indicated that her average gross monthly income for the 
years 1998 through 2002 was $1,649.00. Therefore, to the extent 
that the petitioner's proposed'Findings can be construed as basing 
the award of alimony on the figure of $1,3 80, those Findings should 
be edited to reflect the Court's clarification herein. 
Further, the respondent has erroneously interpreted this 
Court's suggestion (not ruling) during the trial that the 
petitioner's income would be set at least at the level of what she 
would be earning in Salt Lake if she were still teaching here. The 
respondent extrapolates from this suggestion that the Court must 
have been adopting Exhibit 99, which would place the petitioner's 
income at $2,683 per month. The respondent's child support figures 
are also based on this monthly income. 
While the Court did not expressly state this in its Memorandum 
Decision, it was not persuaded that the petitioner's earning 
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capacity could be judged by the traditional salary schedule 
represented in Exhibit 99. Rather, as indicated above, the Court 
was relying on the historic income information provided in Exhibit 
8 9 because it found these figures to better reflect the reality 
that even when she was working as a full-time teacher, the 
petitioner never earned more than $22,969.00 per year. 
Moreover, in awarding alimony, the Court particularly focused 
on the respondent's expenses. During the trial, the Court made 
some tentative reductions in these expenses that would bring them 
to a more appropriate and reasonable level. Although the 
respondent relies in large part on these reductions, the Court 
emphasizes that these were only tentative and were subject to the 
Court's revision after it took the matter under advisement. In 
fact, after doing so, the Court was able to closely examine the 
totality of the respondent's claimed expenditures in light of the 
fact that Ana would soon be emancipated. Based on this 
examination, the Court concluded that the petitioner's Finding of 
Fact 98, which further reduced the respondent's expenses to $2,189, 
was accurate and should be adopted. 
Finally, the respondent argues that he has no ability to pay 
the alimony awarded by the Court on his gross monthly income of 
$4,300. Given that his reasonable expenditures are only $2,189, 
the respondent does have the ability to pay the $2,000 alimony 
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award. Further, the respondent's argument completely ignores the 
fact that the Court awarded the respondent the entirety of the 
Schovaers Electronics stock, which was potentially valued in the 
hundreds of thousands of dollars. The Court is not persuaded that 
simply because this stock has no defined dividend or income stream, 
it should be ignored entirely in assessing ability to pay. The 
stock and the interest it represents is a valuable asset which 
cannot be overlooked when considering the totality of the 
respondent's overall financial condition and ability to pay. 
Overall, the Court remains convinced that the alimony awarded 
by it was neither improper nor excessive. Further, the amount of 
child support proposed by the respondent is based on an incorrect 
set of figures. The foregoing clarifications regarding the actual 
figures relied on by the Court should make this point clear. 
Therefore, the Court denies the respondent's Motion to Amend, 
Motion for New Trial and Motion to Alter in the entirety. (Counsel 
for the petitioner is to prepare an Order on the denial of these 
Motions which is consistent with this Court's Ruling). 
That brings the Court to the current status of this case. 
After reviewing the file and the respondent's Motion for Relief 
from Entry of Findings, there appears to be a consensus among the 
parties and counsel that the Court's entry of the petitioner's 
amended Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce 
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was unanticipated. The Court concurs that the entry of these 
documents may have been premature, given the pendency of the 
Motions addressed herein and the respondent's Objections. 
Therefore, the Court grants the respondent's Motion for Relief and 
vacates the Findings, Conclusions and Decree entered by the Court 
on December 23, 2003. Counsel for the respondent is to prepare an 
Order vacating the same. 
Instead, the Court would like counsel to reevaluate both the 
final version of the petitioner's amended Findings, Conclusions and 
Decree and the respondent's Objections thereto in light of the 
clarifying statements and the decision made herein. Counsel should 
confer and attempt to work out any final Objections posed by the 
respondent in light of this Court's Ruling. If any Objections 
remain, the Court requests that counsel submit (1) a copy of the 
final amended version of the petitioner's proposed Findings, 
Conclusions and Decree; (2) a copy of the remaining Objections to 
the Court's law clerk; and (3) the petitioner's response thereto, 
to the Court's law clerk, Alexandra C. Doctorman. 
Dated this -3u _day of April, 2 004. 
$ 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN & FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPHINE M. SCHOVAERS, 
Petitioner, ) 
V S . j 
JOHN C. SCHOVAERS 
Respondent. ) 
i FINDINGS OF FACTS 
1 & 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
> (Amended as per Court's 4/20/04 Ruling) 
l Case #014903735 
I Judge Leslie Lewis 
i Commissioner Casey 
BACKGROUND 
On August 25-26, 2003, the Court conducted a trial in the above-captioned matter. 
Petitioner, Josephine M Schovaers ("Ms. Schovaers"), was present and represented by her 
attorney Frank N. CalL Respondent John C. Schovaers ("Mr. Schovaers"), was present and 
represented by his attorney Bert L. Dart. Both Mr. Schovaers and Ms. Schovaers were called and 
testified as witnesses. Various exhibits were oflFered and admitted into evidence. On October 31, 
2003, the Court issued a Memorandum Decision that set forth the Court's ruling in this matter. 
On December 23, 2003, the Court signed and entered findings, conclusions and a decree of 
divorce (collectively referred to as the "Initial Findings & Decree"). However, the Court later 
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vacated the Initial Findings & Decree in order to address objections and motions that had been 
made prior to the Court's entry of those documents. Having now addressed and ruled upon those 
objections and motions in the Court's Ruling of October April 20,2004, the Court intends these 
written findings of facts and conclusions of law, and decree of divorce that is to be entered 
pursuant to these findings and conclusions (collectively referred to as the "Final Findings & 
Decree") to be and set forth Court's final decision and rulings in this matter. The Court notes 
that, since trial and issuance of the Initial Findings & Decree, the parties have complied with the 
Court's instruction concerning sale of the parties' home and that the parties have stipulated to 
various additional matters that are noted and set forth herein* 
As a final note of introduction, Anna, the parties' daughter, has become emancipated 
since the time of trial and issuance of the Initial Findings & Decree. Thus, pursuant to an 
agreement of the parties, the Final Findings & Decree have been modified from the Initial Findings 
& Decree so as to omit orders relating to Anna's ongoing support and/or custody as those issues 
are now moot. However, nothing in the Final Findings & Decree is intended to alter the Court's 
prior rulings and orders relating to the parties' respective obligations and rights with regard to 
Anna while she was a minor. 
Based on the evidence, testimony and arguments presented to the Court during the trial, 
the Court makes and issues the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. At the time of trial, Ms. Schovaers was 50 years of age and was residing in Lake 
Stevens, Washington. 
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2. At the time of trial, Mr. Schovaers was 49 years of age and was residing in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. 
3. At the time of the filing of the Petition for Divorce in this case, both parties were 
residing in Salt Lake County, Utah, and had been doing so for more than one year. 
4. Ms. Schovaers and Mr. Schovaers were married to each other in Utah on May 15, 
1979. 
5. At the time of trial, the parties had been married for more than 24 years. 
6. After their marriage, the parties lived and resided together in Utah until the time of 
their separation. 
7. The parties separated and began living apart from each other in about April or May 
of2001. 
8. Irreconcilable differences have arisen which prevent the parties from maintaining a 
viable marriage. 
9. The parties have agreed that they should be granted a decree of divorce on the 
ground of irreconcilable differences. 
10. The parties have had two children born as issue of their marriage: Aundrea 
Schovaers (D.O.B. 11/13/80) ("Aundrea"); and Anna Schovaers (D.O.B. 1/29/86) ("Anna"). 
11. Aundrea was an adult at the time of the filing of the Petition for Divorce. 
12. At the time of the filing of the Petition for Divorce, and at the time of trial, Anna 
was a minor. 
13. Anna has resided in Utah at all relevant times and was, at the time of trial, residing 
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with Mr. Schovaers. 
14. Utah is Anna's home state pursuant to U.C.A. §78-45c-201. 
15. There are no other cases relating to Anna pending before any court of this state, or 
any court of any other state. 
16. The parties agreed that they should have joint legal custody of Anna while she was 
a minor. 
17. The parties agreed that Mr. Schovaers would be awarded physical custody of 
Anna while she was a minor, with Ms. Schovaers to have visitation with Anna pursuant to any 
schedule agreed to between Ms. Schovaers and Anna. Furthermore, the parties agreed that Ms. 
Schovaers would be responsible for the costs of exercising visitation with Anna. 
18. The parties agreed that Mr. Schovaers would encourage and facilitate Anna's 
visitation with Ms. Schovaers and would encourage and facilitate written and telephonic 
communication between Anna and Ms. Schovaers. 
19. At the time of trial, Mr. Schovaers was employed fiill-time with Schovaers 
Electronics and had a gross monthly income of $4,300.00 per month. 
20. Prior to the parties' separation, Mr. Schovaers was earing approximately 
$6,000.00 per month. However, after the parties" separation, Mr. Schovaers pay was reduced to 
$4,300.00 per month because of the reduction in work hours necessitated by his having to assume 
all of the parenting and household responsibilities. 
21. Historically, during the last Ml five years prior to trial (1998 through 2002), Mr. 
Schovaers had the following gross income as a result of his employment with Schovaers 
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Electronics1: 
Year 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
firggg Annual Tnrnme 
$ 70,150.00 
$ 71,400.00 
$ 72,651.00 
$ 57,200.00 
$ 51,600.00 
Gross Monthly Income 
$ 5,845.00 
$ 5,950.00 
$ 6,054.00 
$ 4,767.00 
$ 4,300.00 
22. Based on the foregoing historic income information for Mr. Schovaers, Mr. 
Schovaers has had an average gross annual income from employment of $64,600.00 per year for 
the past five years, which equates to an average gross monthly income of $5,383.00 per month. 
23. At the time of trial Ms. Schovaers was employed part-time as a Sales Clerk for 
The Bon^ and as an "on-calT substitute teacher for various school districts in Washington. 
24. At the time of trial Ms. Schovaers had a gross monthly income from all 
employment of $1,380.00 per month. 
25. Mr. Schovaers asserts that Ms. Schovaers is currently voluntarily under-employed 
and capable of finding full-time employment. 
26. Immediately prior to the parties' separation. Ms. Schovaers was working part-time 
as a teacher for Jordan School District. 
27. Historically, during the last full five years prior to trial (1998 through 2002), Ms. 
lThe listed figures were taken from the right-hand column on page 3 of Exhibit #93 which 
is Mr. Schovaers' Social Security Statement. The listed figures are also consistent with the 
testimony and income information for Mr. Schovaers as set forth in the various income tax 
statement that were admitted as exhibits. Kg. Exhibits #35, #36, #37, #38, & #94. 
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Schovaers had the following gross income from her employment2: 
Year 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
Gross Annual Income 
$ 19,358.00 
$20,038.00 
$ 13,997.00 
$ 22,969.00 
$ 19,796.00 
Gross Monthly Income 
$ 1,613.00 
$ 1,669.00 
$ 1,166.00 
$ 1,914.00 
$ 1,649.00 
28* Based on the foregoing historic income information for Ms. Schovaers, Ms. 
Schovaers has had an average gross annual income from employment of $19,231.00 per year, 
which equates to an average gross monthly income of $1,602.00 per month. 
29. Ms. Schovaers has never earned a gross annual income greater than $22,969.00 
per year ($1,914.00 per month), even when she was working full-time as a teacher. 
30. Based on Ms. Schovaers' historical average gross monthly income between 1998 
and 2002, it would be reasonable to impute a gross monthly income of $1,649.00 per month to 
Ms. Schovaers for purposes of determining alimony, even though Ms. Schovaers' actual gross 
monthly income at the time of trial was $1,380.00 per month. 
31. Prior to and during the course of their marriage, the parties acquired various items 
of personal property that have been listed in Exhibit #21. 
32. The parties agree, as to the property listed in Exhibit #21, the Court should award 
Ms. Schovaers the property listed in: "Exhibit A" of Exhibit #21; Exhibit B" of Exhibit #21; and 
2The listed figures were taken from the right-hand column on page 3 of Exhibit #89 which 
is Ms. Schovaers' Social Security Statement. The listed figures are also consistent with the 
testimony and income information for Ms. Schovaers as set forth in the various income tax 
statement that were admitted as exhibits. E.g. Exhibits #35, #36, #37, #81, & #82. 
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those items of property identified as "Requested by Petitioner" in Exhibit C of Exhibit #21. 
33. The parties have agreed that Mr. Schovaers shall make copies of all of post-
separation photographs of the parties' children in his possession and deliver copies of those 
photographs to Ms. Schovaers. 
34. During the course of the parties' marriage, the parties purchased and acquired a 
home and real property located at 1888 Spring Lane, Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 (the "home"). 
35. During the course of the parties9 marriage, the home was titled and held in the 
parties' joint names and was intended and held by the parties as joint marital property. 
36. Later, during the pendency of this case, the Court permitted Mr. Schovaers to 
refinance the home in order to lower the monthly mortgage payments. 
37. As part of that refinancing, Mr. Schovaers was permitted to have Ms. Schovaers' 
name removed from the title to the home without effecting her ownership interest in the home. 
38. At the time of trial the home was subject to a mortgage that was held by 
Countywide Home Loans, Inc (the "Countrywide mortgage"). 
39. Since the parties' separation, Mr. Schovaers has made mortgage payments on the 
parties' home in the amount of $32,848.00. Ms. Schovaers" one-half share of those mortgage 
payments would be $16,424.00. 
40. The parties agreed that the home was martial property and that the home should be 
sold and the net proceeds divided between the parties. 
41. After trial the parties sold the home and used the proceeds to pay the 
Countrywide mortgage and pay the sales commission and cbsing costs associated with the sale. 
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42. The parties divided the net proceeds from the sale of the home equally between 
themselves, but made adjustments by: (1) taking $12,549.50 from Mr. Schovaers' share and 
giving it to Ms. Schovaers as payment for her share of the parties' bank/investment accounts; (2) 
taking $16,424.00 from Ms. Schovaers' share and giving it to Mr. Schovaers as payment for her 
one-half share of the mortgage payments that Mr. Schovaers made between the time of separation 
and trial; (3) taking $1,798.50 from Ms. Schovaers1 share and giving it to Mr. Schovaers as 
payment for her one-half share of the 2003 property taxes that were paid by Mr. Schovaers; (4) 
taking $2,165.00 from Ms. Schovaers' share and giving it to Mr. Schovaers as payment for her 
one-half share of the mortgage payments that Mr. Schovaers made from the time of trial to the 
date the home was sold; and (5) taking $2,585.00 from Ms. Schovaers' share and giving it to Mr. 
Schovaers in order to equitably divide the value of the vehicles that were awarded to the parties. 
A calculation of the parties' division and distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the home is 
attached hereto as "Exhibit A." 
43. The parties' agreed division and allocation of the proceeds from the sale of the 
home as set forth above and in Exhibit A was reasonable, equitable and consistent with the 
Court's anticipated ruling in this matter. 
44. To the extent, if any, that Mr. Schovaers has not already paid the various expenses 
relating to the parties' home, and except as otherwise dealt with by the parties in their division of 
the proceeds from the sale of the home, it would be reasonable and equitable to order Mr. 
Schovaers to be solely responsible for paying any expenses relating to the home, including but not 
limited to any and all utilities, repairs, insurance premiums and/or other expenses. 
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45. At the time of the parties' separation, the parties had at least $34,000.00 of joint 
martial funds in various bank/investment accounts with such funds being held at: Paine Webber; 
U.S. Bank; Charles Schwab: Community 1st National; and Treasury Credit Union.3 
46. Since the parties' separation, Mr. Schovaers has paid $6,522.00 worth of property 
taxes on the parties' home. 
47. At the time of trial, Ms. Schovaers had control over accounts having $2,379.00 of 
the parties' joint marital funds (Funds held in the Treasury Credit Union account and the proceeds 
from the Community 1st National account) 
48. If the Court were to equally divided the funds in the parties' joint marital 
bank/investment accounts at the time of separation, but fectoring in tax payments and those joint 
funds currently in Ms. Schovaers' possession, Ms. Schovaers would be entitled to $12,549.50, 
with that amount being calculated as follows: 
Total Joint Account holdings at separation $34,000.00 
Property taxes paid by Mr. Schovaers between separation & trial ($ 6,522.00) 
Funds in Ms. Schovaers possession at trial ($ 2.379.00) 
Total Funds Subject to Division $25,099.00 
$25,099,00 + 2 = $12,549,50 
49. It would be feir and equitable to award Ms. Schovaers $12,549.50 worth of the 
3
 At the time of the parties' separation, the parties" joint bank/investment accounts actually 
had approximately $40,760.00 of fluids in them but the Court is using $34,000.00 as the total 
balance of those accounts in order to account for funds that were deposited into the accounts but 
actually belong to the parties' children and to account for funds that Ms. Schovaers took from 
one of the accounts when the parties separated. 
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parties' bank/investment accounts. 
50. During the course of the parties' marriage, Mr. Schovaers acquired ownership of 
116 shares of stock in Schovaers Electronics, with the value at the time of each acquisition of the 
stock as indicated below: 
Acquisition Date # Shares Total Value Value per share 
3/15/85 35 shares $16,873.90 $ 482.11/share 
9/30/98 34 shares $19,886.32 $ 584.89/share 
12/16/91 13 shares $19,383.00 $l,491.00/share 
4/30/92 13 shares $19,539.00 $l,503.00/share 
10/15/93 12 shares $19,965.00 $l,663.75/share 
12/22/95 9 shares $19,116.09 $2,214.01/share 
See, Exhibits #47 & #48. 
51. At the time of each acquisition, the stock was valued by Mr. Schovaers' parents, 
who were the owners and grantors of the stock. 
52. As of December 22,1995, the last time when Mr. Schovaers acquired shares of the 
Schovaers Electronic^ stock, the shares had, as determined by the owners and grantors of the 
stock, a value of $2,214.01 per share, making the value of the 116 shares held by Mr. Schovaers 
worth at least $256,825.16. See, page 6 of Exhibit #48. 
53. Over the ten year time span when the stocks were acquired by Mr. Schovaers, the 
shares of stock only increased in value and never declined in value during any given year. 
54. On an annualized basis, from date of first acquisition (3/15/85), to date of the last 
acquisition (12/22/95), the stock has increased in value, as determined by the owners and grantors 
of the stock, at least 35.9% per year. ($482.11/share in 1985 to $2,214.01/share in 1995). 
55. If a historic rate of appreciation of 35% per year were used to value the stock, the 
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shares would currently be worth about $24,425.00 per share, or $2,833,300.00 for all 116 shares. 
56. The Court finds that the stock was given solely to Mr. Schovaers as discrete gifts 
from his parents, and not by way of any employment compensation. 
57. Furthermore, the Court finds that Mr. Schovaers intended to keep the stock as 
separate property and that the stock was never co-mingled with marital property. 
58. During the course of the parties' marriage, the parties acquired ownership of a 
Ford Truck and a 1999 Jeep Grand Cherokee, neither of which are subject to any liens or loans. 
59. At the time of trial, the Ford truck had a fair market value of $1,500.00 and the 
1999 Jeep Grand Cherokee had a feir market value of $11,175.00. 
60. About 30 days prior to trial, Mr. Schovaers purchased a new 2003 Jeep Grand 
Cherokee that is subject to a loan in an amount that is almost equal to the full price of the Jeep. 
61. The parties agree that the Ford Truck should be awarded to Mr. Schovaers as his 
sole property and that the 1999 Jeep be awarded to Ms. Schovaers as her sole property. 
62. The parties agree that the 2003 Jeep should be awarded to Mr. Schovaers as his 
sole property and that he shall be solely responsible for any loans relating to that vehicle. (The 
parties' equity in the 2003 Jeep is virtually zero since the Jeep is subject to a does not have any 
markSince the 2003 Jeep was 
63. The parties have agreed that Ms. Schovaers should pay $2,585.00 from the 
proceeds from the sale of the home to compensate Mr. Schovaers for the diflfering values of the 
vehicles that are being awarded to the parties. 
64. During the course of the parties' marriage, Mr. Schovaers obtained a limited 
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partnership interest in a family partnership that was established by his parents. 
65. In January of 2003, Mr. Schovaers received a distribution from that family 
partnership in the form of a promissory note. See Exhibit #62. 
66. Mr. Schovaers has never commingled the promissory note with marital assets and 
has never intended the promissory note to be converted to joint or marital property. 
67. Other than the mortgage and the loan on the 2003 Jeep, the parties have no debts. 
68* Each party has been able to pay for their own attorney's fees in this case and are 
not in need of assistance from the other party in paying those fees. 
69. Ms. Schovaers' maiden name was "McEntire." 
70. During the parties' marriage, Ms. Schovaers worked for Schovaers Electronics for 
about nine to twelve months but was not paid for that wort (Mr. Schovaers contests this feet.) 
71. After about one year of marriage, the parties agreed that Ms. Schovaers would 
forego employment or post-high school education in order to be responsible for the day-to-day 
care of the parties' children and home. 
72. Thereafter, Ms. Schovaers did forego any employment and/or post-high school 
education for several years in order to be responsible for the day-to-day care of the parties' 
children and home. 
73. During the course of the parties' marriage, Mr. Schovaers regularly worked 
between 60 to 70 hours per week at Schovaers Electronics. 
74. But for Ms. Schovaers' actions in foregoing employment and post-high school 
education and assuming responsibility for the day-to-day care of the parties' children and home, 
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Mr. Schovaers would not have been able to dedicate as much time and effort as he did to his 
employment and advancement at Schovaers Electronics. 
75. Ms. Schovaers9 actions in foregoing employment, foregoing post-high school 
education, and assuming responsibility for the day-to-day care of the parties' children and home 
significantly increased Mr. Schovaers" earning capability and advancement at Schovaers 
Electronics. 
76. In 1991. while she continued to be responsible for the day-to-day care of the 
parties' children and home, Ms. Schovaers began going to college on a part-time basis and 
eventually graduated in late 1997. 
77. Initially, Mr. Schovaers was opposed to Ms. Schovaers going to college and 
required her to pay for her college education by using non-marital funds that she had inherited. 
78. Later, Mr. Schovaers contributed to some of Ms. Schovaers' tuition expenses. 
79. Ms. Schovaers eventually obtained a teaching certificate and was endorsed to 
teach art, with a secondary endorsement in history. 
80. In 1998, Ms. Schovaers began working as a full-time teacher for Granite School 
District. 
81. Later, Ms. Schovaers left employment with Granite School District and began 
working for Jordan School District on a foll-time basis. 
82. After working for Jordan School District for a period of time, Ms. Schovaers' full-
time teaching load in Art was reduced because of budget cuts. However, Ms. Schovaers was 
offered additional classes in other subjects but would have been required to return to college ami 
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Phi. 
obtain additional training and endorsements in order to teach those additional classes on a 
permanent basis. 
83. Rather than incur the additional time and expense of returning to college to obtain 
additional education and endorsements, Ms. Schovaers continued teaching part-time for Jordan 
School district and eventually obtained part-time employment with ZCMI and later with the May 
Stores in order to supplement her income. 
84* Due to her extended absence from the work-force, her age, and her delayed 
acquisition of a post-high school education in order to care for the parties' children and home, 
Ms. Schovaers" lifetime earning potential has been significantly and permanently impaired. 
85. During the course of the parties' marriage, and at the time of their separation, the 
parties enjoyed a high standard of living. 
86. The parties' income tax returns for the three tax years immediately prior to their 
separation indicate that the parties has a joint annual income of about $90,000 per year. See 
Exhibits #35, #36, & #37. 
87. Ms. Schovaers testified that prior to and at the time of their separation, she was 
able to purchase whatever she wanted and had never been unable to purchase any items or 
services that she and/or Mr. Schovaers desired. 
88. For example, testimony at trial indicated that, prior to and at the time of their 
separation, the parties: 
(a) Had purchased and were living in a 4,200 square foot luxury home in the 
prestigious Cottonwood/Walker Lane residential neighborhood of Salt Lake County; 
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home; 
places; 
(b) Had purchased and maintained elaborate and fitting furnishings for their 
(c) Regularly and frequently skied; 
(d) Traveled when they desired, vacationing in Idaho, the Northwest, and other 
(e) Regularly boated at Lake Powell; 
f f) Took their children to Europe for vacation; 
(g) Engaged in whatever entertainment activities they desired; 
(h) Saved significant sums of money which they invested in various stocks and 
bonds; 
(i) Purchased whatever clothing they desired; and 
(j) Were generally able to live and maintain an upper class lifestyle, 
89. Ms. Schovaers testified that due to the parties' separation and the significant 
reduction in fiinds available to her, she has been forced to eliminate all of her discretionary 
expenses and has had to skimp on, and in some cases, even forego some of her most basic 
necessary living needs and expenses. 
90. The amounts that Ms. Schovaers current claims to be spending for basic necessary 
living expenses are set forth in Exhibit #98. 
91. For example, Ms. Schovaers testified that since the parties' separation, she has, 
among other things: 
(a) Been forced to live in a 600 square foot apartment in an industrial/low 
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income neighborhood; 
(b) Has less than $L300.00 of earned income each month to meet her basic 
necessary living expenses; 
(c) Has not been skiing because she cannot afford it; 
(d) Has not been on any vacations since she cannot afford it; 
(e) Except for hiking which is free, and basic cable television service, she has 
not spent any money on entertainment because she cannot afford it; 
(f) Cannot afford to make gifts or donations; and 
(g) Cannot afford to purchase insurance to replace the health insurance that 
she will lose once the parties are divorced. 
92. Ms. Schovaers also testified that she had depleted almost all of her savings in order 
to meet her basic necessary living expenses and has been required to purchase generic brand foods 
and shop at second stores in order to help meet her expenses. Mr. Schovaers9 counsel even 
acknowledged during closing arguments that Ms. Schovaers' expenses were "spartan.'" 
93. Ms. Schovaers is clearly in need of significant financial assistance from Mr. 
Schovaers in order to meet even her most basic necessary living expenses. 
94. Unlike Ms. Schovaers, since the parties1 separation, Mr. Schovaers has been able 
to maintain the same lifestyle that the parties had prior to and at the time of the parties' 
separation. For example, Mr. Schovaers has been able to: 
(a) Continue to living in the parties' luxury 4,200 square foot home; 
(b) Spend in excess of $4,137.00 per month on various expenses; 
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(c) Engage in and spend significant sums on entertainment; 
(d) Engage in and spend significant sums on vacations; 
(e) Spend significant sums on gifts to friends and family; 
(f) Spend significant sums on donations to charities and other organizations; 
and 
(g) Purchase of a new 2003 Jeep. See, Exhibit #26. 
95. In feet Mr. Schovaers* counsel acknowledged in closing arguments that some of 
Mr. Schovaers* claimed expenses were excessive and more than what was needed for such 
expenses. 
96. The Court finds that many of Mr. Schovaers' claimed basic living expenses, as 
alleged in Exhibit #26, are excessive and inappropriate for purposes of determining his ability to 
pay alimony. For example: 
(a) Mr. Schovaers7 claimed expense of $287.00 per month for property taxes 
is inappropriate to consider for purposes of determining Mr. Schovaers' ability to pay alimony 
because the Court is giving Mr. Schovaers' full credit for those taxes when calculating how to 
split the parties' bank/investment accounts. To let Mr. Schovaers claim those property tax 
payments again as part of his alleged monthly living expenses would allow him to claim those 
expenses twice. 
(b) Mr. Schovaers' claimed expense of $65.00 per month for real property 
insurance and $125.00 per month for home maintenance will be eliminated by hte sale of the 
parties' home, thereby making those expenses unnecessary and inapplicable when determining Mr. 
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Schovaers' ability to pay alimony. 
(c) Mr. Schovaers' claimed monthly food expense of $700.00 is unreasonable 
and far exceeds Mr. Schovaers' needs. First, it would be inappropriate to include the food costs 
for Aundrea in determining Mr. Schovaers9 ability to pay alimony since Aundrea is an adult. 
Furthermore, it would bestow an inappropriate and significant windfall upon Mr. Schovaers to 
permit him to claim food expenses relating to Anna for purposes of determining his ability to pay 
alimony in light of Ms. Schovaers9 obligation to pay child support for Anna during her minority 
and since Anna is/was only about six months away from emancipation at the time of trial Thus, a 
more appropriate amount for Mr. Schovaers food expense would be $250.00 per month. 
(d) Mr. Schovaers" claimed utility expenses of $432.00 per month (electric, 
gas, sewer, water, phone, etc) are unreasonably high for purposes of determining his ability to pay 
alimony since those expense are based on utilities for the parties' large 4,200 square foot home 
that is/was sold. Furthermore, since Anna is/was only about six months away from emancipation 
at the time of trial, it would bestow an inappropriate and significant windfall upon Mr. Schovaers 
to permit him to claim expenses relating to Anna for purposes of determining his ability to pay 
alimony. A more reasonable amount for Mr. Schovaers' utility expense in light of the anticipated 
emancipation of Anna and the sale of the home would be $250.00 per month. 
(e) Mr. Schovaers' claimed clothing expense of 325.00 per month for both he 
and Anna is unreasonable. It would bestow an inappropriate and significant windfall upon Mr. 
Schovaers to permit him to clothing expenses relating to Anna for purposes of determining his 
ability to pay alimony in light of Ms. Schovaers' obligation to pay child support for Anna during 
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her minority and since Anna is/was only about six months away from emancipation at the time of 
trial. Thus, a more reasonable amount for Mr. Schovaers1 clothing expense would be $150.00 per 
month. 
(f) Mr. Schovaers' claimed expenses for Anna's schooling is inappropriate to 
consider for purposes of determining alimony. It would bestow an inappropriate and significant 
windfell upon Mr. Schovaers to permit him to claim Anna's school expenses for purposes of 
determining his ability to pay alimony in light of Ms. Schovaers9 obligation to pay child support 
for Anna during her minority and since Anna is/was only about six months away from 
emancipation at the time of trial 
(g) Mr. Schovaers' claimed expenses of $ 150.00 per month for gifts and 
donations are purely discretionary expenses that are not necessary basic living expenses. 
(h) Mr. Schovaers' claimed expenses of $371.00 per month for auto expenses 
is unreasonable under the circumstances. A more reasonable amount for this expense would be 
$200.00 per month. 
(i) Mr. Schovaers' claimed new expense of $511.00 per month for his 
purchase of the new 2003 Jeep is unreasonable under the circumstances, particularly when Mr. 
Schovaers claims to have a reduced income and previously claimed to be unable to service the 
previous home mortgage of about $1,600.00 per month, which the Court then permitted him to 
refinance to about $620.00 per month. Although Mr. Schovaers may actually be paying $511.00 
per month for the new 2003 Jeep, it was unreasonable for Mr. Schovaers to incur such an 
obligation just one month before the trial in this matter. A more reasonable amount for this 
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expense for purposes of determining his ability to pay alimony would be $350.00 per month. 
97. For purposes of determining Mr. Schovaers1 ability to pay alimony, the Court finds 
that Mr. Schovaers' reasonable basic living expenses are as follows: 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(9 
(g) 
(h) 
0) 
(j) 
(k) 
Mortgage 
Food 
Utilities 
Laundry & Dry Cleaning 
Clothing 
Medical/Dental 
Insurance 
Entertainment 
Vacation/Travel 
Auto Expense/Maintenance 
Car Payment 
$ 619.00 
$ 250.00 
$ 250.00 
$ 50.00 
$ 150.00 
$ 20.00 
$ 25.00 
$ 150.00 
$ 125.00 
$ 200.00 
$ 350.00 
Total Monthly Expenses $2 A 89.00 
98. In light of Mr. Schovaers'* average gross monthly income of $5,383.00 per month 
over the past five years, Mr. Schovaers has the ability to pay at least $2,000.00 per month, if not 
more, toward alimony after paying for his basic necessary living expenses. 
99. Even if Mr. Schovaers' reduced gross monthly income of $4,300 per month were 
used, Mr. Schovaers would have the ability to pay at least $2,000.00 per month, if not more, 
toward alimony after paying for his basic necessary living expenses. 
100. Furthermore, Mr. Schoavers' ability to pay alimony of at least $2,000,00 per 
month is bolstered by the fact that the Court is awarding Mr. Schovaers all of the Schovaers 
Electronics stock which is worth hundreds of thousands of dollars. Thus, Mr. Schovaers clearly 
has the financial ability and resources to pay alimony of at least $2,000,00 per month 
101. Ms. Schovaers is not able to maintain the standard of living she enjoyed prior to 
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and/or at the time of the parties' separation without significant financial assistance from Mr. 
Schovaers. 
102. Ms. Schovaers is in need of financial assistance in order to meet even her basic 
necessary living expenses. 
103. Mr. Schovaers has the financial ability to pay at least $2,000.00 per month of 
alimony to Ms. Schovaers. 
104. Although Ms. Schovaers has obtained a teaching certificate and is capable of 
obtaining full-time employment, her earing capacity has been significantly and permanently 
impaired because of her age, the delay in entering the workforce, and her limited teaching 
experience. 
105. Ms. Schovaers has never earned more than $22,969.00 per year, even when she 
was working full-time. 
106. Although the Court is imputing a monthly gross income of $1,649.00 per month to 
Ms. Schovaers for purposes of determining alimony, even if Ms. Schovaers' highest actual annual 
earnings of $22,969.00 per year ($1,914.00 per month) were imputed to her, alimony payments of 
$24,000.00 per year ($2,000.00 per month) would give Ms. Schovaers an annual income of about 
$46,900.00, which is roughly the standard of living she enjoyed prior to and at the time of the 
parties' separation (At the time of separation, the parties' joint income exceeded $90,000.00; 
$90,000 - 2 people = $45,000 per person). 
107. In order to equalize the parties' respective standards of living, and in order to 
restore Ms. Schovaers to a semblance of the standard of living that she had prior to and at the 
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time of the parties' separation, Ms. Schovaers would need financial assistance from Mr. 
Schovaers in the amount of at least $24,000.00 per year ($2,000.00 per month). 
108. The Court finds that the parties' situation is a classic case where alimony should be 
awarded. This is a marriage that is long in duration and wherein the parties' respective incomes 
are greatly disparate. Credible evidence was presented to the Court that Ms. Schovaers agreed to 
forego employment and educational opportunities for the purpose of staying at home to raise the 
parties' children and to facilitate and enable Mr. Schovaers to work extensive hours at his family's 
business. The result was that Mr. Schovaers was able to dedicate himself to that business and 
earn a salary which provided a "high-end" lifestyle for the parties and their children. In sharp 
contrast to this lifestyle, Ms. Schovaers now lives in what can only be described as a meager 
existence. By her own account, Ms. Schovaers9 standard of living has significantly diminished. 
109. Clearly, Ms. Schovaers has unmet financial needs and Mr. Schovaers has a 
demonstrated ability to assist Ms. Schovaers in terms of paying alimony. In evaluating Mr. 
Schovaers' ability, the Court particularly focused on the feet that Mr. Schovaers greatly inflated 
his claimed expenses. Therefore, after evaluating the parties' total financial picture and taking 
into account their respective assets and property, their respective income levels in light of their 
reasonable expenses, and the lifestyle enjoyed during, their marriage, the Court determines that it 
would be equitable, reasonable and proper to set alimony at $2,000.00 per month. 
110. Setting alimony at $2,000.00 per month would raise Ms. Schovaers' standard of 
living to approximately what she enjoyed during the parties' marriage. 
111. During the parties1 marriage: 
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(a) Mr. Schovaers obtained and acquired an interest in retirement benefits 
and/or profit sharing plans provided and/or maintained by Schovaers Electronics; 
(b) Mr. Schovaers obtained and acquired an interest in an Individual 
Retirement Account(s) with Paine Webber; 
(c) Ms. Schovaers obtained and acquired an interest in retirement benefits 
and/or 401(k) plan maintained by Utah Retirement Systems; and 
(d) Ms. Schovaers obtained and acquired an interest in an Individual 
Retirement Account(s) with Paine Webber. 
112. The parties agree that all of their respective retirement plan benefits were acquired 
during the course of their marriage and that those retirement plan benefits are joint marital assets 
that should be equally divided between the parties and subject to a qualified domestic relations 
order. The parties also agree that, if possible,, Ms. Schovaers' one-half share of the Schovaers 
Electronics profit sharing plan assets should be divided and distributed in kind so as to avoki any 
valuation disputes. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction in this matter and venue is proper. 
2. The parties should be granted a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable 
differences. 
3. Since Anna is now emancipated, the Court need not make any further orders 
concerning Anna's custody, visitation and support. However, to the extent that the parties have 
not already paid and satisfied their financial obligations to each other with respect to Anna white 
she was a minor, the parties should be entitled and ordered to do so.4 
4. As to the issue of alimony: 
(a) Ms. Schovaers1 current financial condition is extremely poor and she 
currently has a standard of living that is drastically lower than the high standard of living that she 
had prior to and at the time of the parties' separation 
(b) Ms. Schovaers is in desperate need of significant financial support as she is 
currently living at a very low income level and is having difficulty meeting even her most basic 
necessary living expenses. 
(c) Because of her age, the delay in entering the workforce, and her limited 
employment experience, Ms. Schovaers" earing capacity has been significantly impaired 
(d) Although Mr. Schovaers was awarded custody of Anna, Anna was 1TA 
years old at the time of trial and approximately 6 months away from emancipation. Furthermore, 
Ms. Schovaers was required to pay child support for Anna to Mr. Schovaers to help defray 
Anna's living expenses. Thus, Mr. Schovaers' custody and expenses relating to Anna did not 
4For purposes of determining the proper level of child support, the Court used Mr. 
Schovaers' current gross monthly income of $4,300.00 and impute income to Ms. Schovaers at a 
level of $1,914.00 per month ($22,969.00 per year), which is the most Ms. Schovaers has ever 
earned per year, even when working full-time. Based on those income levels, Ms. Schovaers was 
to pay Mr. Schovaers $187.88 per month for Anna's support until the later of either: Anna's 18th 
birthday, or graduation from high school, whichever is later, with the payment of such amount to 
be made by giving Mr. Schovaers a credit of $187.88 per month against his monthly 
alimony/support payments to Ms. Schovaers. To the extent those payments/credits have not 
already been made and/or applied, the parties should be entitled to those payments/credits. 
-24-
materially impact or reduce his ability to pay alimony. 
(e) Ms. Schovaers did, for about 9 to 12 months, work for Schovaers 
Electronics during the parties9 marriage for which Ms. Schovaers claims she was not paid 
(f) But for Ms. Schovaers' actions in foregoing employment and education in 
order to care for the parties' children and home, Mr. Schovaers would not have been able to 
dedicate as much time and efifort as he did to his employment and his advancement at Schovaers 
Electronics. Ms. Schovaers' actions of foregoing employment and education, and assuming 
responsibility for the day-to-day care of the parties' home and children significantly and materially 
increased Mr. Schovaers' earnings, earning capability and employment advancement, while 
simultaneously significantly impairing Ms. Schovaers own earning abilities. 
(g) Currently, Mr. Schovaers is gainfully employed and enjoys an extremely 
high standard of living that meets and/or exceeds the standard of living that he enjoyed prior to 
and/or at the time of the parties' separation. 
(h) Over the last five years prior to trial, Mr. Schovaers had an average gross 
monthly income of $5,383.00 per month. 
(i) Many of Mr. Schovaers' claimed basic necessary living expenses are 
excessive, inflated and inappropriate to consider for purposes of determining Mr. Schovaers' 
ability to pay alimony because they include: 
(1) Expenses for which Mr. Schovaers is/was reimbursed by Ms. 
Schovaers' child support payments; 
(2) Expenses for the Aundrea, the parties' adult daughter; 
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(3) Discretionary in nature and/or for non-essential purposes such as 
gifts, donations, etc. 
(4) Expenses for which Mr. Schovaers will/has received full credit for 
in the distribution of the sale proceeds from the parties' home and/or division of the parties' 
bank/investment accounts (e.g. the mortgage and property tax expenditures); and 
(5) Obligations and expenses for Anna which were going to be and 
have now been eliminated due to Anna's emancipation six months after triaL 
(j) Ms. Schovaers' reasonable basic necessary living expenses amount to 
approximately $2,189.00 per month. 
(k) Given his current monthly income of $4,300.00, his five year historical 
average monthly income of $5,383.00, and the valuable Schovaers Electronics stock and other 
property being awarded to him, Mr. Schovaers has significant ability to pay at least $2,000.00 per 
month toward alimony after paying for his basic necessary living expenses. 
(1) It would be reasonable to impute a monthly gross income of $1,649.00 to 
Ms. Schovaers for purposes of fixing alimony. However, even if Ms. Schovaers' highest actual 
annual earnings of $22,969.00 per year were imputed to her, alimony payments of $24,000.00 per 
year ($2,000.00 per month) would give Ms. Schovaers an annual income of about $46,900.00, 
which is roughly the standard of living she enjoyed prior to and at the time of the parties' 
separation.5 The Court reiterates that it is not basing Ms. Schovaers' need for alimony on her 
5At the time of separation, the parties' joint income exceeded $90,000.00; $90,000 + 2 
people = $45,000 per person. 
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actual gross monthly income of $1,380.00, but rather on an imputed gross monthly income of 
$1,914.08 per month, which is the most Ms. Schovaers ever earned while working full-time.6 
5. Thus, the factors set forth in U.C.A. §30-3-5(8)(a) weigh heavily in favor of an 
order requiring Mr. Schovaers to pay alimony to Ms. Schovaers. The Court finds and concludes 
that the parties' situation is a classic case where alimony should be awarded This is a marriage 
that was long in duration and where the parties' respective incomes are greatly disparate. 
Credible evidence was presented to the Court that Ms. Schovaers agreed to forego employment 
and educational opportunities for the purpose of staying at home to raise the parties* children and 
to facilitate and enable Mr. Schovaers to work extensive hours at his family's business. The result 
was that Mr. Schovaers was able to dedicate himself to that business and earn a salary which 
provided a "high-end" lifestyle for the parties and their children. In sharp contrast to this lifestyle, 
Ms. Schovaers now lives in what can only be described as a meager existence. By her own 
account, Ms. Schovaers9 standard of living has significantly diminished. Clearly, Ms. Schovaers 
has unmet financial needs and Mr. Schovaers has a demonstrated ability to assist Ms. Schovaers in 
terms of paying alimony. In evaluating Mr. Schovaers9 ability, the Court particularly focused on 
the fact that Mr. Schovaers greatly inflated his claimed expenses. Therefore, after evaluating the 
parties' total financial picture, taking into account their respective assets and property, the 
property and funds divided and awarded to them as part of this divorce, their respective income 
6Imputing income of $1,914.00 per month to Ms. Schovaers actually weighs in Mr. 
Schovaers' favor since the Court has found it would be reasonable to impute only $1,649.00 of 
income per month to Ms. Schovaers for purposes of determining alimony. See 1flf27-30, f 106. 
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levels in light of their reasonable expenses, and the lifestyle enjoyed during their marriage, the 
Court determines that it would be equitable, reasonable and proper to set and award Ms. 
Schovaers alimony in the amount of $2,000.00 per month. Setting alimony at $2,000.00 per 
month would raise Ms. Schovaers" standard of living to approximately what she enjoyed during 
the parties' marriage without impacting Mr. Schovaers1 ability to maintain that lifestyle for 
himself. 
6. Accordingly, Mr. Schovaers should be ordered to pay Ms. Schovaers $2,000.00 
per month for 22 years (264 months) for alimony. However, pursuant to the provisions found in 
U.GA. §30-3-5(8) and U.C.A- §30-3-5(9), Mr. Schovaers' obligation to pay alimony to Ms. 
Schovaers shall automatically terminate upon Ms. Schovaers' death, re-marriage or cohabitation 
with another person. 
7. The parties' home was joint marital property. 
8. The parties' agreed division and allocation of the proceeds from the sale of the 
home as set forth above in Findings #41, Finding #42 and Exhibit A was reasonable, equitable and 
consistent with the Court's anticipated ruling in this matter. 
9. Since the parties' sale and division of those sale proceeds from the home were, 
reasonable, fair and equitable in light of the circumstances, the Court should issue an order 
affirming and approving of the parties" sale of the home and division of the sales proceeds. 
10. To the extent, if any, that Mr. Schovaers has not already paid the various expenses 
relating to the parties' home, and except as otherwise dealt with by the parties in their division of 
the proceeds from the sale of the home, the Court should order Mr. Schovaers to be solely 
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responsible for paying any unpaid expenses relating to the home without any right of 
reimbursement and/or contribution from Ms. Schovaers, including but not limited to any and all 
utilities, repairs, insurance premiums and/or other expenses. 
11. Ms. Schovaers should be awarded all of the property currently in her possession, 
free and clear of any claims by Mr. Schovaers. 
12. As to the property listed in Exhibit #21, the Court should award Ms. Schovaers the 
property listed in: "Exhibit A" of Exhibit #21; "Exhibit B" of Exhibit #21; and those items of 
property identified as "Requested by Petitioner" in Exhibit C of Exhibit #21. 
13. Mr. Schovaers should be ordered to make copies of all of the post-separation 
photographs of the parties' children in his possession and deliver copies of those photographs to 
Ms. Schovaers. 
14. Mr. Schovaers should be awarded all of the other remaining household personal 
property in his possession free and clear of any claims by Ms. Schovaers. 
15. Mr. Schovaers should be awarded the Ford truck and the 2003 Jeep as his sole and 
separate property, free and clear of any claims by Ms. Schovaers, with Mr. Schovaers being solely 
responsible for any and all loans, liens and/or expenses relating to such vehicles. 
16. Ms. Schovaers should be awarded the 1999 Jeep as her sole and separate property, 
free and clear of any claims by Mr. Schovaers, with Ms. Schovaers being solely responsible for 
any and all loans, liens and/or expenses relating to such vehicle. 
17. It was reasonable for the parties to fairly divide and allocate the value of the 
vehicles being awarded to them in the distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the parties' 
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home. 
18. All of the parties1 respective retirement accounts, pensions, profit-sharing plans, 
401K plans, and/or other retirement type accounts/assets that have accrued or been acquired 
during the course of the parties' marriage up to the date of decree of divorce is entered in this 
matter, including but not limited to: the Schovaers Electronics profit sharing plan; the Utah 
Systems 401 (k) plan; and the parties' respective IRA's should be allocated and divided equally 
between the parties, with each party being awarded one-half of all such retirement assets. The 
Court should also issue a Qualified Domestic Relations Order ordering each party's share in such 
retirement benefits to be allocated and equally divided between the parties, with the division to be 
by an in-kind division of the actual assets of the accounts where possible so as to avoid any 
valuation disputes. 
19. The 116 shares of Schovaers Electronics stock should be awarded to Mr. 
Schovaers. 
20. Ms. Schovaers should be awarded $12,549.50 from Mr. Schovaers' share of the 
net sale proceeds of the parties' home as payment for her share of the parties' joint 
bank/investment accounts and it was reasonable for the parties to arrange for the payment of that 
amount in the distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the parties' home. 
21. Mr. Schovaers should be awarded the promissory note from his parents as his sole 
and separate property, free and clear of any claims by Ms. Schovaers. 
22. Except for the 2003 Jeep for which Mr. Schovaers is to be solely responsible and 
responsible, the parties appear to have no other debts. To the extent that such debts do exists, 
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each party should be ordered to be solely responsible for their own respective debts. 
23. The parties should be ordered to be responsible for their own respective attorney's 
fees and court costs. 
24. Ms. Schovaers should be restored to her maiden name of McEntire. 
25. The Court's allocation and division of the parties' assets and debts as set forth 
above is fair and equitable. 
26. The Court should enter a Decree of Divorce with orders consistent with the terms 
set forth herein, with such decree being issued nunc pro tunc so as to be effective as of December 
23, 2003, the entry date of the December Decree which was previously vacated by the Court 
However, pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure, even though the decree 
should be issued nunc pro tunc, the parties should have 30 days from the date this decree is 
entered in which to file any notice of appeal. 
B Y ORR^?OF THE COURT / $ 
DATED: \ o \ z f r \ c H aC^MJ^C C 
LESLIE LEWIS 
UTAH DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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EXHIBIT A 
CALCULATION & DIVISION OF PROCEEDS FROM SALE OF HOME 
$303,426.00 Net proceeds from sale after full payment of mortgage & sales commission 
Mr. Schovaers Ms. Schovaers 
$151,713.00 $151,713.00 Half of net sale proceeds 
(12,549.50) 12,549.50 Adjustment for division of parties' bank/investment 
accounts. 
16,424.00 (16,424,00) Adjustment to reimburse Mr. Schovaers for Ms. 
Schovaeirs7 half of pre-trial mortgage payments that 
were paid by Mr. Schovaers. 
1,798.50 (1,798.50) Adjustment to reimburse Mr. Schovaers for Ms. 
Schovaers' half of 2003 property taxes that were 
paid by Mr. Schovaers.1 
2,165.00 (2,165.00) Adjustment to reimburse Mr. Schovaers for Ms. 
Schovaers' half of post-trial mortgage payments that 
were paid by Mr. Schovaers. 
2,585.00 (2,585.00) Adjustment for allocation of differing values of the 
vehicles that were awarded to the parties. 
$162,136.00 $141,290.00 Final Share of Distribution of Home Sale Proceeds 
*Ms. Schovaers' payment for her one-half share of the property taxes that Mr. Schovaers 
paid from the time of separation to the time of trial was credited to Mr. Schovaers when the 
Court calculated the division of the parties' bank/investment accounts. See, Finding #48 & #49. 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
. . . . ^ Third Judicial District IMAGED 
FrankN. Call (U.S.B. #6846) U I 2 8 200*1 
68 South Main Street, Suite 701 / W S S r u T ^ 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 * i— Deputy cm 
Phone Number: (801) 532-9909 
Attorney for Petitioner, Josephine M. Schovaers ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS 
DAT6_il t ( ' OM 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
m & FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPHINE M. SCHOVAERS, 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ) 
JOHN C. SCHOVAERS J 
Respondent. ] 
i DECREE OF DIVORCE 
) (With Orders) 
l Case #014903735 
i Judge Leslie Lewis 
l Commissioner Casey 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Based on the Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law (Amended as per Court's 
4/20/04 Ruling) that have been made and entered by the Court, THE COURT HEREBY 
DECREES AND ORDERS AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Josephine M Schovaers ("Ms. Schovaers") and John C. Schovaers ("Mr 
Schovaers") are granted a divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. 
2. Since the parties' child, Anna Schovaers, is now emancipated, the Court need not 
make any further orders concerning Anna's custody, visitation and support. However, to the 
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extent that the parties have not already paid and satisfied their financial obligations to each other 
with respect to Anna while she was a minor, the parties are ordered to pay and satisfy those 
obligations.1 
3. Mr. Schovaers is ordered to pay alimony to Ms. Schovaers in the amount of 
$2,000.00 per month for the next 22 years (264 months)* However, pursuant to the provisions 
found in U.C.A. §30-3-5(8) and U.C.A. §30-3-5(9), Mr. Schovaers' obligation to pay alimony to 
Ms. Schovaers shall automatically terminate upon Ms. Schovaers9 death, re-marriage or 
cohabitation with another person. In no event shall Mr. Schovaers' alimony obligation to Ms. 
Schovaers last longer than 22 years (264 months) from the effective date of this Decree. 
4. The Court hereby approves and affirms the parties* sale and agreed division and 
allocation of the proceeds from the sale of the parties' home as being reasonable, equitable and 
consistent with the Court's anticipated ruling in this matter. See, Findings of Fact & Conclusions 
ofLawffl41-42. 
5. To the extent, if any, that Mr. Schovaers has not already paid the various expenses 
relating to the parties' home, and except as otherwise dealt with by the parties in their division of 
the proceeds from the sale of the home, Mr. Schovaers is ordered to be solely responsible for 
'Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce that was previously entered but later vacated by the 
Court, Ms. Schovaers was to pay Mr. Schovaers $187 88 per month for Anna's support until the 
later of Anna's 18th birthday or graduation from high school with the payment of that child 
support to be made by giving Mr. Schovaers a credit of $187.88 per month against his monthly 
alimony/support payments to Ms. Schovaers until the later of Anna's 18th birthday or graduation 
from high school. To the extent that Mr. Schovaers has not already taken and applied those 
credits, Mr. Schovaers shall be entitled to do so. 
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paying any unpaid expenses relating to the home without any right of reimbursement and/or 
contribution from Ms. Schovaers, including but not limited to any and all unpaid utilities, repairs, 
insurance premiums and/or otter expenses. 
6. Ms. Schovaers is hereby awarded all of the property currently in her possession, 
free and clear of any claims by Mr. Schovaers. 
7. As to the property listed in Trial Exhibit #21, Ms. Schovaers is awarded all of the 
property listed in: "Exhibit A* of Exhibit #21; "Exhibit B" of Exhibit #21; and those items of 
property identified as "Requested by Petitioner" in Exhibit C of Exhibit #21. 
8. Mr. Schovaers is ordered to make copies of all of the post-separation photographs 
of the parties' children in his possession and deliver copies of those photographs to Ms. 
Schovaers within 30 days after the entry of this decree. 
9. Mr. Schovaers is awarded all of the other remaining household personal property 
in his possession free and clear of any claims by Ms. Schovaers. 
10. Mr. Schovaers is hereby awarded the Ford truck and the 2003 Jeep as his sole and 
separate property, free and clear of any claims by Ms. Schovaers, with Mr. Schovaers being 
ordered to be solely responsible for any and all loans, liens and/or expenses relating to such 
vehicles. 
11. Ms. Schovaers is hereby awarded the 1999 Jeep as her sole and separate property, 
free and clear of any claims by Mr. Schovaers, with Ms. Schovaers being ordered to be solely 
responsible for any and all loans, liens and/or expenses relating to such vehicle. 
12. All of the parties' respective retirement accounts, pensions, profit-sharing plans, 
-3-
noof 
401K plans, and/or other retirement type accounts/assets that have accrued or been acquired 
during the course of the parties1 marriage up to the effective date of this decree of divorce 
(December 23,2003), including but not limited to: the Schovaers Electronics profit sharing plan; 
the Utah Systems 401(k) plan; and the parties' respective IRA's shall be allocated and divided 
equally between the parties, with each party being awarded one-half of all such retirement assets. 
The Court shall also issue a Qualified Domestic Relations Order(s) ordering each party's share in 
such retirement benefits to be allocated and equally divided between the parties, with the division 
to be by an in-kind division of the actual assets of the accounts where possible so as to avoid any 
valuation disputes.2 
13. The 116 shares of Schovaers Electronics stock are hereby awarded to Mr. 
Schovaers free and clear of any claims by Ms. Schovaers. 
14. Mr. Schovaers is awarded the promissory note from his parents as his sole and 
separate property, free and clear of any claims by Ms. Schovaers. 
15. Except for the 2003 Jeep for which Mr. Schovaers is to be solely responsible and 
responsible, the parties appear to have no other debts. To the extent that such debts do exists, 
each party is hereby ordered to be solely responsible for their own respective debts. 
16. The parties shall be responsible for their own respective attorney's fees and court 
2If mutually agreed to by both parties, the parties may keep all of the retirement plans 
except the Schovaers Electronics profit sharing plan registered as they currently are and then pay 
and split their respective one-half interest in all of the plans between themselves by making an 
appropriate adjustment to the division of the assets in the Schovaers Electronics profit sharing 
plan. 
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costs. 
17. Ms. Schovaers is hereby restored to her maiden name of "Josephine McEntire." 
18. This Decree of Divorce and the orders set forth herein are issued nunc pro time so 
as to be effective as of December 23,2003, the entry date of the previously vacated findings, 
conclusions and decree. Pursuant to Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the 
parties shall have 30 days from the date this Decree of Divorce is actually entered in which to file 
any notice of appeal 
DATED: \ D \ E M P M 
BY ORDERTOF THE COURT 
-J? < 
LESLIE LEWIS 
UTAH DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY/ STATE OP UTAH 
JOSEPHINE M. SCHOVAERS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JOHN C. SCHOVAERS, 
Respondent. 
COURT'S RULING 
CASE NO. 014903735 
The Court has before it a number of documents which require 
this Court's rulings. First, the Court notes that soon after it 
issued its prior Court's Ruling, on April 20, 2004, the respondent 
renewed his objection as to one portion of the petitioner's 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (See 
Respondent's Objection, filed on July 8, 2004). This Objection 
pertains to the duration of alimony and the provision for the 
termination of alimony in the event of remarriage, cohabitation, 
etc. The petitioner responded to this Objection on July 16, 2004. 
The respondent filed a Reply on July 20, 2004, which incorporates 
alternate language for two of the paragraphs in the proposed 
Findings. On July 22, 2004, the petitioner filed a "Sur-
Response," addressing the proposed changes and arguing that they 
are substantive changes of the Court's prior orders. On August 2, 
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2004, the respondent objected to the Court's consideration of the 
Sur-Response. 
Unfortunately, while this matter has been submitted for 
decision on several different occasions,, beginning with the filing 
of a Notice to Submit on July 16, 2004, it has only recently come 
to the Court's attention. The Court apologizes for the delay in 
ruling on this matter. 
After the respondent's Objection, the petitioner's Response 
and the final Reply (the Court declined to consider the Sur-
Response), the Court determines that the respondent's Objections 
are not well-taken and are therefore denied. The Court is 
satisfied that the petitioner's language concerning the duration of 
alimony is proper and should not be altered in the manner proposed 
by the respondent. Accordingly, the respondent's Objection is 
denied. The Court has entered the petitioner's proposed Findings 
of Facts & Conclusions of Law (Amended as per Court's 4/20/04 
Ruling) and Decree of Divorce (With Orders) on a date 
contemporaneous with this Court's Ruling. 
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This Court's Ruling will stand as the Order of the Court, 
denying the respondent's Objection. 
Dated t h i s Z^iclay of October, >2f6Jb4. 
/ / 
stithy u ^ 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Court's Ruling, to the following, this /3l day of 
October, 2004: 
Frank N. Call 
Attorney for Petitioner 
68 S. Main Street, Suite 701 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
B. L. Dart 
Attorney for Respondent 
370 E. South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
-oooOOOooo— 
JOSEPHINE M. SCHOVAERS. 
Petitioner, 
v. 
JOHN C. SCHOVAERS, 
Respondent. 
RULE,52(b) MOTION TO AMEND 
FINDINGS AND RULE 59(a) 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL AND 
RULE 59(E) MOTION TO ALTER 
OR AMEND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 014903735 
Judge Lewis 
Commissioner Casey 
—oooOOOooo--
COMES NOW respondent pursuant to Rule 52(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure and moves the Court for an Order amending the Findings of Fact which it has adopted 
under its Memorandum Decision. Respondent further moves the Court to alter or amend the 
ruling of the Memorandum Decision on the issue of alimony and child support pursuant to Rule 
59(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 59(a) (6) and (7) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
From a review of the Memorandum Decision is becomes apparent that the Court 
did not have available to it respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact at the time it rendered its 
decision. There is concern that respondent's Findings of Fact may possibly have been misfiled. 
The Memorandum Decision recites that petitioner filed her proposed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law approximately September 16,2003, and the respondent submitted 
his proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law approximately September 30,2003. In 
fact, respondent submitted his proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the 12th of 
September, 2003 and a copy of the cover letter to the Court and a copy of those Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law are attached hereto as Exhibit "A". Thereafter, petitioner's attorney filed 
a proposed Decree of Divorce. When respondent's attorney contacted him concerning this, 
petitioner's attorney stated that he had had a call from the Court and that the Court was desirous 
of both counsel providing proposed Decrees of Divorce as well as the proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. Respondent's attorney thereupon submitted to the Court on September 
30,2003, his proposed Decree of Divorce and a copy of the cover letter to the Court and a copy 
of that proposed Decree of Divorce are attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
It is apparent that the Court in making its decision was reviewing Petitioner's 
Proposed Findings of Fact submitted on September 16,2003 and Respondent's Proposed Decree 
of Divorce submitted approximately September 30, 2003. This fact becomes obvious where the 
Court in paragraph 2 of its legal analysis directs petitioner's attorney to redraft the Findings as to 
the residence of the parties and to "incorporate paragraph 5(a) of the respondent's proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.'' As can be seen from the attached exhibits, there is no 
paragraph 5(a) of respondent's proposed Findings of Fact. The reference is obviously to 
paragraph 5(a) of respondent's proposed Decree of Divorce, which relates to the house. 
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The problem which is created is that the Court did not have the benefit of 
respondent's proposed Findings of Fact which contained the rationale and support for 
respondent's positions, particularly as they relate to alimony. 
Alimony 
In reviewing the Court's analysis as to the issue of alimony, it is apparent that error 
has occurred. 
Income 
In analyzing an award of alimony it is necessary to look at the respective incomes 
of the parties. The income of the parties is as follows: 
1. The Court in its Memorandum Decision finds that respondent's gross 
monthly income is $4,300 a month. 
2. The Court in its Memorandum Decision directed petitioner's attorney to 
incorporate his Findings of Fact which in paragraph 24 finds that petitioner has a gross monthly 
income from all employment of $1,380 per month. This is contrary to the ruling which was made 
by the Court at the close of the evidence at the time of the closing arguments of counsel. A 
transcript of the closing arguments has been ordered but to this time has not been received. 
Accompanying this Motion, however, is a copy of the tape of the closing arguments. 
The Court's statement regarding petitioner's income is found at 8/26/03,11:06.33 
a.m. The Court stated, 
UI expect her income to be set at at least what she would be 
earning in Salt Lake if she were still teaching here as reflected 
on the exhibit that was received and summer income added 
into that at the rate of $8.00, so we will use Utah figures." 
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The exhibit in question was Exhibit 99, attached hereto as Exhibit "CM and is referenced in 
paragraph 9 of respondent's proposed Findings of Fact, showing that petitioner's earnings had she 
stayed in Utah as a teacher and had she kept summer employment in Utah, would have been 
$2,683 gross monthly income. This is consistent with the Child Support Worksheet prepared 
respondent showing a child support amount of $2:58 attached to respondent's proposed Findings 
ofFact 
Respondent, John Schovaers, simply does not have sufficient income to pay a 
$2,000 a month alimony award and, further, the $2,000 alimony award creates a tremendous 
inequity between the parties. 
Even if the Court were attempting to equalize the income of the parties, there can 
be no basis for the award of $2,000 a month in alimony. 
The equalization would be as follows: 
Petitioner's income: Respondent's income; 
$ 2,683 $ 4,300 
Reduction for child support 
expenses of Anna: ( 258) ( 422) 
$ 2,425) $ 3,787 
Alimony to equalize: + 681 ( 681) 
Total: $ 3,106 3,106 
The effect of the proposed $2,000 a month alimony award is as follows: 
Petitioner's income; Respondents income: 
$ 2,683 $ 4,300 
Reduction for expenses of Anna: ( 258) ( 422) 
$ 2,425) $ 3,787 
Alimony + 2,000 ( 2,000) 
Total Available to Each Party: $ 4,425 1,787 
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Expenses 
The Court in awarding alimony must also look to the expenses of the parties. 
With regard to expenses, the analysis is as follows: 
1. Respondent's expenses were set forth in his Exhibit 26, reflecting an 
amount of $4,137 a month. The Court during trial in reviewing that exhibit made specific findings 
that several of those expenses were higher than the Court felt to be appropriate and the Court 
made the adjustments shown on respondents Proposed Findings of Fact, paragraph 7, attached, as 
follows: 
a. Food should be reduced from $700 to $400, a reduction of $300. 
b. Clothing should be reduced from $325 to $200, a reduction of 
$125. 
c. Automobile expenses should be reduced from $371 to $271, a 
reduction of $100. 
d. Respondent's purchase of an automobile at a cost of $511 a month 
was found to be excessive but the Court found that he was in need of an additional vehicle since 
the pickup truck he was driving had 191,000 miles on it and was in poor condition. The Court at 
that time indicated that respondent could have financed transportation at a lesser cost of $250 a 
month, which would be a reduction off the amount claimed by respondent of $261 a month. 
The total of these adjustments is $786, leaving respondent with reasonable 
living expenses of $3,351 a month for him and the minor daughter, Anna. 
The Court has now changed its position if it accepts petitioner's Finding of 
Fact 98, which would pare those expenses back to $2,189 a month. 
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2. Petitioner1 s only statement of expenses ever filed were introduced as 
Exhibit 98, reflecting monthly expenses of $ 1,743. Petitioner did testify that the parties did have a 
higher standard of living during the marriage but there was never a time that that amount was 
quantified by petitioner during the trial or even under petitioner's Proposed Findings of Fact 89 tp 
establish what that standard of living was. 
It is difficult to understand how the Court could find that petitioner's 
expenses are any more than the $2,189 it is proposing are the reasonable expenses of respondent 
and the minor daughter, Anna 
The Court in its Memorandum Decision stated, 
"Therefore, after evaluating the parties' total financial 
picture and taking into account their respective income 
levels and in light of their reasonable expenses and the 
lifestyles enjoyed during their marriage, the Court 
determines that alimony is property set at $2,000 a month/' 
The problem with this ruling is that even if the Court does find that the 
lifestyle of the parties during the marriage is higher than their current lifestyles, there was never a 
quantification of what that lifestyle was and, more important, there is no money to make an 
alimony payment. Respondent does not have a sufficient income to meet his own expenses and 
make an alimony payment in that amount. 
It is because petitioner's ability to earn an income exceeds her current 
needs that respondent has taken the position that no alimony should be paid. 
The Court's finding that "alimony in the amount of $2,000 would raise the 
petitioner's standard of living to approximately what she enjoyed during the parties' marriage," 
cannot be made in a vacuum and has to be made in the context of respondent's ability to provide 
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support. Rehn v. Rehn. 974 P.2d 306 (1999 Court of Appeals). In this case there simply isn't 
$2,000 available. 
The simple fact is that neither party is going to be able to live to the 
lifestyle that existed during the marriage. There will need to be a belt tightening on the part of 
both parties. 
Child Support 
Based upon the amount of income which the Court has imputed to each of the 
parties, the appropriate amount of child support is the sum of $258 a month as reflected on the 
Child Support Worksheet attached to respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact. 
It is respectfully requested that the Court reconsider its rulings regarding alimony 
and child support based upon the foregoing. 
DATED this 13th day of November, 2003.
 t y 
/ / , / 
/ / / ' 
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B. L. DART 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 13* day of November, 2003,1 mailed a copy of the 
foregoing to: 
Frank N. Call 
Attorney for Petitioner 
68 South Main Street, #701 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
dktr^K MfJJ 
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The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis 
District Court Judge 
450 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Schovaers v. Schovaers; Civil No. 014903735 
Dear Judge Lewis: 
Pursuant to your instructions, I am enclosing our proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in this case* 
It is my understanding that Frank Call is still in the process of preparing his 
Findings and, hopefully, will have them to you shortly. /) 
B.L.Dart 
BLD/skm 
Enclosure 
cc: John Schovaers 
Frank Call 
B.L. DART (818) 
DART, ADAMSON, & DONOVAN 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 521-6383 
Attorneys for Respondent 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
—-oooOooo— 
JOSEPHINE ML SCHOVAERS, : RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Petitioner, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
v. : 
JOHN C. SCHOVAERS, : Case No. 014903735 
Respondent. : Hon. Leslie Lewis 
Comm T. Patrick Casey 
—oooOooo— 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on Monday, the 25* day of August 
and Tuesday, the 26th day of August, 2003, Petitioner appearing in person and by her attorney 
Frank N. Call, and Respondent appearing in person and by his attorney B. L. Dart, and the Court 
having heard testimony from witnesses and having received exhibits and various stipulations and 
the matter having been argued and submitted, the Court hereby makes the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner and Respondent were both residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
for the three month period immediately prior to the filing of this action for divorce. 
2. Petitioner and Respondent were married in Salt Lake City on the 15* day of May, 
1979, and since that time have been husband and wife. 
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3. Differences have now arisen between the parties which the Court finds are 
irreconcilable, and each of the parties should be awarded a decree of divorce from the other on 
the grounds of irreconcilable differences to become final upon signing and entry. 
4. Petitioner and Respondent have two children as issue of this marriage: Aundrea, 
age 22, who is an adult and emancipated, and Anna, age 17, bora January 29,1986. The parties 
should be awarded the joint legal custody of Anna with her physical residence to be with 
Respondent and with Petitioner to have visitation with Anna as regularly as can be arranged 
without forcing Anna to engage in visitation contrary to her desires. 
Respondent should encourage and facilitate a relationship between Anna and 
Petitioner and Petitioner should consider engaging in counseling to repair the relationship between 
her and Anna. 
5. Petitioner filed with the Court her statement of monthly expenses, introduced as 
Exhibit 98, reflecting monthly expenses of $1,743 a month. Even though the Exhibit reflects 
$183 for credit card charges which were for clothing and gasoline otherwise shown on the 
Exhibit, the Court finds that this is not a duplication and further finds that the monthly expenses of 
$1,743 for Petitioner are reasonable. 
6. Petitioner testified that her living expenses during the marriage were substantially 
higher but failed to quantify what those expenses were on a monthly basis except to say that she 
feels she should have an alimony award of $2,500. The Court finds that this claim is not 
supported by the evidence either as to her established need or Respondent's ability to meet an 
alimony award in that amount. 
7. Respondent introduced Exhibit 26 setting forth his monthly expenses for himself 
and the minor daughter of the parties, Anna, in the amount of $4,137 a month. The Court in 
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reviewing this Exhibit finds that several of these expenses are higher than the Court feels 
appropriate and would make the following adjustments: 
a. Food should be reduced from $700 to $400, a reduction of $300. 
b. Clothing should be reduced from $325 to $200, a reduction of $125. 
c. Automobile expenses should be reduced from $371 to $271, a reduction of 
$100. 
d. Respondent within the month before the divorce trial purchased a Jeep 
automobile which was financed at a cost of $511 a month which the Court finds is excessive. The 
Court does find that Respondent was in need of an additional vehicle to meet the needs of 
Respondent and Anna, particularly since the only other vehicle was a pickup truck with 191,000 
miles on it and in poor condition. The Court finds that Respondent could have financed 
transportation at a lesser cost of $250 a month, which would be a reduction off the amount 
claimed by Respondent of $261 a month. 
e. The total of these adjustments is $786, which when deducted from 
Respondent's Statement of Monthly Expenses at $4,137 leaves $3,351 a month in expenses which 
the Court finds to be reasonable for the living expenses of Respondent and the minor daughter, 
Anna. 
8. Petitioner returned to school and obtained a bachelor's degree in 1998, She 
thereupon took employment in the Granite School District as a full-time teacher followed by 
employment in the Jordan School District as a full-time teacher. In the 1999 year, Petitioner 
earned income from her employment with Jordan School District of $20,038 as reflected on her 
1999 W-2 attached to the joint tax return of the parties introduced as Exhibit 35. Petitioner 
thereafter voluntarily reduced her employment to part-time employment, and approximately a year 
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following the filing of this action for divorce, Petitioner voluntarily terminated her employment 
with Jordan School District and moved to the State of Washington. Since she has been in the 
State of Washington, Petitioner has been unsuccessful in finding employment as a teacher based 
upon the current lack of teaching positions in Washington Petitioner's decision to teach only 
part-time and her further decision to go to the State of Washington where employment as a 
teacher is not currently available were voluntary decisions which have created a current under-
employment which cannot be the basis of establishing her income potential for alimony purposes, 
9. Respondent introduced Exhibit 99 which shows that a teacher with a bachelor's 
level degree having taught five years in Jordan School District would be earning between $28,065 
and $29,377 for the 9-month school year, and the Court finds that this is an amount that 
Petitioner could be earning as a teacher if she had not voluntarily terminated her employment and 
moved to Washington. The Court uses the lower figure of $28,065. The teaching position is a 
9-month position There was further testimony that Petitioner who has experience as a 
department store sales clerk could earn income at $8.00 as a cleric an hour consistent with her 
former employment with Meier & Frank in Salt Lake City. Assuming 40 hours a week at $8.00 
an hour for the three months of the year, Petitioner could earn additional income of $4,128 a year. 
When the teaching employment and sales clerk employment are added together, the Court finds 
that Petitioner could earn a gross annual income of $32,193 or $2,683 gross monthly income. 
10. Respondent is currently employed at Schovaers Electronics and his income is 
reflected on his pay stub introduced as Exhibit 25 which shows that he earns $2,150 per twice-
monthly pay period or $4,300 gross per month, which is $51,600 gross per year. Respondent's 
current monthly take-home income after deducting federal and state taxes, FICA and Medicare is 
$1J00 twice a month or $3,400 net per month. 
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11. Petitioner claims that Respondent has historically earned a higher income and in 
fact prior to the year 2001 was receiving a gross salary of $68,400 a year or $5,700 a month. 
This salary was based upon Respondent working extensive amounts of overtime, which was made 
possible by petitioner taking care of the house and children. His testimony was that he worked 
65-70 hours a week. Petitioner's testimony was; that he was working 60 hours per week. 
When Petitioner left, Respondent reduced his hours of employment to be able to 
cover the needs of the minor daughter of the parties and his new household responsibilities and he 
is currently working 50 hours a week for his current salary. The Court finds that it would not be 
appropriate to base either child support or alimony on Respondent's historical income at a work 
level so far in excess of full-time employment. The Court finds that a reasonable amount to be 
used for Respondent's income for child support and alimony purposes is his current income of 
$51,600 a year or $4,300 a month. 
12. Attached hereto is a Child Support Worksheet based upon the parties' respective 
abilities to earn income. Based upon this Worksheet which assumes a gross income to 
Respondent of $4,300 a month and a gross income to Petitioner of $2,683, Petitioner should pay 
to Respondent child support of $258 a month commencing with the month of September, 2003 
and continuing until such time as Anna reaches the age of 18 and has graduated from high school 
in ordinary course, whichever occurs later. 
While Petitioner has a legal obligation for child support for Anna, in view of the 
Court's analysis on alimony, hereinafter set forth, and in view of the present financial 
circumstances of the parties, and finally in view of the fact that Anna will graduate from high 
school within the upcoming school year, the Court finds that any obligation for child support 
should be abated based upon the alimony ruling hereinafter set forth. 
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13. In evaluating Petitioner's claim for alimony, the Court is required to look at three 
factors. These are Petitioner's need for alimony, Petitioner's ability to meet that need, and 
Respondent's ability to pay alimony to assist in meeting Petitioner's need. As to these three 
factors, the Court finds as follows: 
a. Petitioner has established that her reasonable monthly expenses are the sum 
of $1,743 as stated in paragraph 5 above. There is no other creditable evidence to establish a 
different figure. 
b. As stated above, the Court finds that Petitioner has the capacity to earn a 
gross monthly income of $2,683 a month. 
c. As stated above, Respondent's gross monthly income is $4,300 and his net 
monthly expendable income is $3,400. Against this, he has reasonable monthly expenses for 
himself and the minor daughter of the parties which the Court finds to be $3,351 per month as 
stated in paragraph 7 above. 
When the foregoing analysis is made, the Court finds that Petitioner is currently 
capable of earning an income suflBcient to meet her monthly needs. Respondent after meeting his 
monthly needs and the needs of the minor daughter has no income above expenses with which to 
make payment of alimony 
Based upon the foregoing analysis, the Court finds that Petitioner should be 
awarded no alimony from Respondent based upon the current financial circumstances of the 
parties. 
14. The property of the parties should be awarded as follows with the award to each 
party to be free of any claim of the other: 
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a. Real Estate. The house and real property at 1888 Spring Lane, Sak Lake 
City, Utah, should be listed by the parties for sale within the next two weeks with an agent of their 
mutual choosing and at a price on which they mutually agree. If the parties are unable to agree 
upon a listing agent, they are each to forthwith provide the Court with the names of two real 
estate agents and the Court will then make a decision from the four names given or of the Court's 
own choosing. If the parties are unable to agree upon a listing price, then the home should be 
appraised immediately by Jerry Webber with each party to bear one-half the cost of the appraisal. 
The listing price will then be at the appraisal figure. 
Upon hs sale, the proceeds of the house are to be paid as follows: 
(1) To cover the then existing mortgage balance owing on the 
property; 
(2) To cover all the expenses related to the sale including the sales 
commission and any closing costs or accrued maintenance such as property taxes; 
(3) To reimburse Respondent for mortgage payments which he has 
made on the home since the separation of the parties at the rate of $1,550 a month from May, 
2001 through October, 2002 and $619 a month from the month of January, 2003 to the time of 
actual sale. 
(4) The remaining sales proceeds should be divided equally between the 
parties 
b. Credits claimed by Respondent. Respondent asserted claims for various 
credits in the amount of $63,374 as set forth on his Exhibit 4. The Court finds that while these 
funds may have been either premarital or gifted from his parents, they nonetheless were put into a 
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joint account of the parties and then into the joint home of the parties, and the Court therefore 
finds that they have been comingled and no longer have their separate identity. 
c. Schovaers Electronics The Court finds that the 116 shares of stock 
in Schovaers Electronics was gifted to Respondent by his parents as shown in Exhibit 5, which 
were the letters of gift to respondent. 
Petitioner asserted an interest in this stock based upon her claim that she 
had been working at Schovaers Electronics before her marriage to respondent and upon her 
marriage to respondent she continued to work but at no pay. In response to this claim, 
respondent produced the payroll book for the year 1979, the year in which the parties were 
married. This payroll book reflects that petitioner continued to be paid after the marriage of the 
parties in May of 1999, contrary to her recall. 
Based upon the foregoing the Court finds that the stock in Schovaers 
Electronics should be awarded to respondent free of any claim of petitioner. 
d. Schovaers Investments. The Court finds that this was a limited 
partnership created by Respondent's parents as an estate-planning device. The only asset which 
Respondent has received from this Investment is $6,000 paid early in the year of 2003 and a 
prospective promissory note issued in 2003 providing for payments to be made in the fature The 
Court finds that Schovaers Investments including the $6,000 payment and the promissory note is 
a gifted, non-marital asset which was not acquired through the efforts of the parties or received 
during the time the parties were together and should be awarded to Respondent free of any claim 
ofPetitioner. 
e. Bank Accounts. At the time of closing arguments, the parties reviewed 
the bank and investment accounts existing at the time of the parties* separation and came to the 
8 
conclusion that an equitable adjustment of these accounts would result in each of the parties being 
awarded their current accounts and Petitioner being awarded a property settlement from 
Respondent in the amount of $11,049 which should be paid by Respondent to Petitioner at such 
time as the house and real property is sold out of his portion of the sales proceeds and after an 
adjustment for the property settlement set forth in paragraph 16 below. 
f. Retirement Accounts. The parties have various retirement accounts 
including the following: 
(1) Petitioner has a Utah Retirement Systems 401(k), a Utah 
Retirement Systems Defined Benefit Plan, and a Paine Webber IRA. 
(2) Respondent has a Schovaers Electronics Profit Sharing Retirement 
Plan and a Paine Webber IRA. 
These Plans are to be divided equally between the parties pursuant to the 
terms of Qualified Domestic Relations Orders and each party should receive one-half the benefit 
of each Plan and be responsible for any tax liability attributable to his or her respective portions. 
g. Life Insurance. Respondent has a term life insurance policy with Jackson 
National Life which has no marital value and which should be awarded to Respondent. 
1L Mediation Fee. Respondent paid the full mediation fee of the parties and 
should receive credit against the division of marital assets in the amoimt of this fee in the sum of 
$680. 
i. Vehicles. 
(1) Petitioner will be awarded the 1999 Jeep Grand Cherokee Laredo 
which the Court finds has a marital value of $11,175, 
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(2) Respondent will be awarded the 2004 Jeep Grand Cherokee which 
he purchased within the month prior to the divorce trial and which the Court finds has no equity. 
(3) Respondent will be awarded the 1993 Ford F250 pickup truck 
which the Court finds has a marital value of $1,500. 
j . Personal Property. Based upon the stipulation of the parties the personal 
property if the parties will be awarded in accordance with Respondent's Exhibit 21 and the lists 
attached thereto as follows with no values ascribed: 
(1) Petitioner will be awarded items listed on Exhibit "A" which if in 
the possession of Respondent will be given to Petitioner, 
(2) Petitioner will be awarded items listed on Exhibit "B" which are 
items she took with her and are currently in her possession; 
(3) Respondent will be awarded items listed on Exhibit "C* which are 
currently in his possession except to the extent that any of those items are listed in Petitioner's 
requested items on Exhibit UA". 
(4) Respondent has the family photographs and Petitioner has the 
negatives up to the time of the parties' separation, and the parties stipulated that this was a fair 
division of these photographs. Respondent should be ordered to provide Petitioner with copies 
of photos taken of the daughters of the parties since the separation to the time of trial. 
15. Based upon the foregoing awards, the division of marital property between the 
parties is as follows: 
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JOSEPHINE JOHN 
1888 Spring Lane, Salt Lake City, UT 
House to be listed and sold and proceeds divided after 
payment of mortgage, sales commission and closing costs, 
accrued property taxes, and reimbursement to Respondent 
for mortgage payments made from the time of separation 
to the time of sale with the remainder to be divided One-half One-half 
equally 
BUSINESS INTEREST 
Schovaers Electronics, 116 shares 
Schovaers Investments 
BANK AND INVESTMENT ACCOIINTS 
Treasury Credit Union #1424 (Josephine) 
Bank of America #69907749 (Josephine) 
US Bank, checking #153150249339 (John) 
Paine Webber #FP 1481432 (Joint) 
US Bank #253100058986 (Custodial account for Anna) 
Schwab #4134-8210 
(Custodial account for Aundrea and Anna) 
RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS (Divide all by QDRO) 
Utah Retirement Systems 401(k) (Josephine) 
Utah Retirement Systems, Defined Benefit Plan 
(Josephine) 
Paine Webber IRA (Josephine) 
Schovaers Electronics Profit Sharing Plan (John) 
Paine Webber IRA #FP 1453332 (John) 
One-half 
One-half 
One-half 
One-half 
One-half 
One-half 
One-half 
One-half 
One-half 
One-half 
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JOSEPHINE JOHN 
LIFE INSURANCE 
Jackson National Life #0017206120 (no cash value) 
PERSONAL PROPERTY AND MISCELLANEOUS 
2004 Jeep Grand Cherokee (John) -0-
Financed 100%; no equity 
1999 Jeep Grand Cherokee Laredo 4WD (Josephine) 11,175 
Value per NADA trade-in 
1993 Ford Truck F250 - Salvage value only 1,500 
Furniture and furnishings (divided per Exhibit 21) Divided Divided 
Credit for mediation fee paid to Marcie Keck (680) 
TOTALS $11,175 $820 
($5,177) $5,177 
NET DISTRIBUTION $5,998 $5,997 
16. Based upon the accounting set forth in paragraph 15 above, the Court finds 
that in order to equalize the property award between the parties, petitioner should pay to 
respondent $5,177, which should be treated as a credit by respondent in the payment of his 
obligation set forth in paragraph 14(e) above on the bank account, which will reduce that 
obligation to the net amount of $5,872 and paid in the manner set forth in paragraph 14(e), 
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17. Petitioner has requested and should be restored to her maiden name of 
McEntire and to be known hereafter as Josephine McEntire. 
18. Based upon the facts and circumstances of this case and the evidence 
presented to the Court, the Court finds that each pany should pay and be responsible for their 
own attorney's fees and costs incurred in the prosecution of this divorce action. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Each of the parties is entitled to a Decree of Divorce, one from the other, 
on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, which Decree shall become final upon signing and 
entry. 
2. The custody of and visitation with Anna shall be as set forth in paragraph 4 
of the Findings of Fact. 
3. Petitioner shall be ordered to pay child support to respondent in an amount 
and upon the terms set forth in paragraph 12 of the Findings of Fact. 
4. No alimony shall be awarded to petitioner. 
5. The property of the parties shall be awarded as set forth in paragraphs 14 
and 15 of the Findings of Fact. 
6. Respondent shall be awarded a property settlement from petitioner in an 
amount and upon the terms set forth in paragraph 16 of the Findings of Fact. 
7. Petitioner shall be restored to her maiden name of Josephine McEntire. 
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8. Each party is ordered to execute any documents and perform any acts 
necessary to effectuate the terms of the Decree of Divorce to be entered hereon 
DATED this day of September, 2003 
BY THE COURT: 
LESLIE LEWIS 
District Court Judge 
14 
B. L. DAK1 (818) 
ART, ADAMSON DONOVAN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPHINE M. SCHOVAERS, 
Petitioner, 
v, 
JOHNC SCHOVAERS, 
Respondent. 
CHILD SUPPORT OBLIGATION WORKSHEET 
(SOLE CUSTODY AND PATERNITY) 
Civil No. 014903735 
Hon Leslie Lewis 
1 Enter the # of natural and adopted children of this mother and father for whom 
support is to be awarded. 
2a. Enter the father's and mother's gross monthly income. Refer to Instructions 
for definition of income 
2b. Enter previously ordered alimony that is actually paid. (Do not enter alimony 
ordered for this case). 
2c. Enter previously ordered child support. (Do not enter obligations ordered for 
the children in Line 1). 
2d, OPTIONAL: Enter the amount from Line 12 of the Children in Present Home 
Worksheet for either parent. 
3, Subtract Lines 2b, 2c, and 2d from 2a This is the Adjusted Gross Income for 
child support purposes. 
4. Take the COMBINED figure in Line 3 and the number of children in Line 1 to 
the Support Table Find the Base Combined Support Obligation. Enter it here. 
5. Divide each parent's adjusted monthly gross in Line 4 by die COMBINED 
adjusted monthly gross in Line 3 
6, Multiply Line 4 by Line 5 for each parent to obtain each parent's share of the 
Base Support Obligation, 
MOTHER 
$2,683 
$2,683 
0.38 
$258 
FATHER 
$4,300 
! $4,300 
COMBINED 
2 
^MH|^H 
$6,983 
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ a i $680 
0.62 
$422 
7. BASE CHILD SUPPORT AWARD: Bring down the amount(s) from Line 6 
or enter the amount(s) from the Low Income table per U C A 78-45-7 7. The 
parent(s) without physical custody of the child(ren) pay(s) the amount(s) all 12 
1 months of the year. 
$258.00 H 
8. 
9. 
10 
Which parent is the obligor7 ( X ) Mother ( ) Father ( )Both 
Is the support award the same as guideline amount in Line 7? ( ) Yes ( ) No 
If NO, enter the amount ordered. $ (Father) $ (Mother) and answer Number 10= 
What were the reasons stated by the Court for the deviation9 
i ) property settlement 
( ) excessive debts of the marriage 
( ) absence of need of the custodial parent 
INCOME HISTORY AND CAPACITY OF PETITIONER 
In 1999, Petitioner was a fiill-time teacher for 9 months at a salary 
of $20,038. See Exhibit UA" attached. 
If Petitioner had remained as a full-time teacher in the Jordan 
School District, her pay at this time would be between $28,065 and 
$29,377 - See Exhibit UBW attached $28,065 
Petitioner has been employed in Salt Lake and now in Washington 
State as a sales. While working as a clerk in Salt Lake, she earned 
$8.00 an hour. Assuming she worked the remaining 3 months of 
the year while not teaching at 40 hours per week at $8.00 an hour, 
this would generate an additional income of $4,128 4,128 
TOTAL ANNUAL INCOME $32,193 
AVERAGE MONTHLY INCOME $2,683 
B L- DART, P C 
CRAIQ O ADAMSON P C 
SHARON A DONOVAN, P C 
JOHN 0 SHEAFPER J« , P C 
CBIC P LCC, P C 
LORI W NELSON, P C 
CRAIG A HOQGAN P C 
AMYC HAYES 
M KEVIN JONCS 
LAW OFFICES 
DART, ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
370 EAST SOUTH TEMPLE. SUITE 4 0 0 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111-1255 
m o i l 521-3383 
r A « <eOl> 355-2513 
OF COUNSEL 
KCNT M, HASTING, P C 
ttJM M MoQOGGOR. P C 
O RANDALL TRUCSLOOO, P C 
September 30, 2003 
The Honorable Leslie A. Lewis 
District Court Judge 
450 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Re: Schovaers v. Schovaers; Civil No. 014903735 
Dear Judge Lewis: 
I was informed by Frank Call that the Court is desirous of both counsel providing 
Proposed Decrees of Divorce as well as the Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
previously submitted. 
Enclosed for your consideration is our Proposed Decree of Divorce. 
Yours very truly, 
B. L. Dart 
BLD/skm 
Enclosure 
cc: John Schovaers 
Frank Call 
B. L. DART (818) 
DART, ADAMSON, & DONOVAN 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801) 521-6383 
Attorneys for Respondent 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
—oooOooo— 
JOSEPHINE M. SCHOVAERS, RESPONDENT'S PROPOSED 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Petitioner, : 
v. 
JOHN C. SCHOVAERS, : Case No. 014903735 
Respondent. : Hon. Leslie Lewis 
Comm. T. Patrick Casey 
—oooOooo— 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial on Monday, the 25th day of August 
and Tuesday, the 26th day of August, 2003, Petitioner appearing in person and by her attorney 
Frank N. Call, and Respondent appearing in person aad by his attorney B. L. Dart, and the Court 
having heard testimony from witnesses and having received exhibits and various stipulations and 
the matter having been argued and submitted, and the Court having made and entered its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, now, therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. Each of the parties is awarded a Decree of Divorce, one from the other, 
on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, which Decree shall become final upon signing and 
entry. 
1 
2. Petitioner and Respondent have two children as issue of this marriage: 
Aundrea, age 22, who is an adult and emancipated, and Anna, age 17, born January 29,1986, 
The parties are awarded the joint legal custody of Anna with her physical residence to be with 
Respondent and with Petitioner to have visitation with Anna as regularly as can be arranged 
without forcing Anna to engage in visitation contrary to her desires. 
Respondent shall encourage and facilitate a relationship between Anna and 
Petitioner and Petitioner shall consider engaging in counseling to repair the relationship between 
her and Anna. 
3. It is ordered that any obligation petitioner has to pay child support is 
abated based upon the alimony ruling hereinafter set forth. 
4. Petitioner is awarded no alimony from Respondent 
5. The property of the parties is awarded as follows with the award to 
each party to be free of any claim of the other: 
a. Real Estate. The house and real property at 1888 Spring Lane, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, shall be listed by the parties for sale within the next two weeks with an 
agent of their mutual choosing and at a price on which they mutually agree. If the parties are 
unable to agree upon a listing agent, they are each to forthwith provide the Court with the names 
of two real estate agents and the Court will then make a decision from the four names given or of 
the Court's own choosing If the parties are unable to agree upon a listing price, then the home 
shall be appraised immediately by Jerry Webber with each party to bear one-half the cost of the 
appraisal The listing price will then be at the appraisal figure. 
2 
Upon its sale, the proceeds of the house are to be paid as follows: 
(1) To cover the then existing mortgage balance owing 
on the property; 
(2) To cover all the expenses related to the sale including the 
sales commission and any closing costs or accrued maintenance such as property taxes; 
(3) To reimburse Respondent for mortgage payments which he 
has made on the home since the separation of the parties at the rate of $1,550 a month from May, 
2001 through October, 2002 and $619 a month from the month of January, 2003 to the time of 
actual sale. 
(4) The remaining sales proceeds shall be divided equally 
between the parties 
b. Credits claimed by Respondent. Respondent's claims for various credits 
in the amount of $63,374 is denied as these funds have been commingled and no longer have their 
separate identity. 
c. Schovaers Electronics. The stock in Schovaers Electronics is 
awarded to respondent free of any claim of petitioner. 
d. Schovaers Investments. The Schovaers Investments including the $6,000 
payment and the promissory note is a gifted, non-marital asset which was not acquired through 
the efforts of the parties or received during the time the parties were together and is awarded to 
Respondent free of any claim of Petitioner. 
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e. Bank Accounts Each of the parties is awarded their current accounts and 
Petitioner being awarded a property settlement from Respondent in the amount of $11,049 which 
should be paid by Respondent to Petitioner at such time as the house and real property is sold out 
of his portion of the sales proceeds and after an adjustment for the property settlement set forth in 
paragraph 7 below, 
f. Retirement Accounts. The parties have various retirement accounts 
including the following: 
(1) Petitioner has a Utah Retirement Systems 401(k), a Utah 
Retirement Systems Defined Benefit Plan, and a Paine Webber IRA. 
(2) Respondent has a Schovaers Electronics Profit Sharing Retirement 
Plan and a Paine Webber IRA. 
These Plans shall be divided equally between the parties pursuant to the 
terms of Qualified Domestic Relations Orders and each party shall receive one-half the benefit of 
each Plan and be responsible for any tax liability attributable to his or her respective portions. 
g- Life Insurance. Respondent has a term life insurance policy with Jackson 
National Life which has no marital value and which is awarded to Respondent. 
h. Mediation Fee. Respondent paid the full mediation fee of the parties and 
shall receive credit against the division of marital assets in the amount of this fee in the sum of 
$680. 
i. Vehicles. 
(1) Petitioner is awarded the 1999 Jeep Grand Cherokee 
Laredo which the Court finds has a marital value of $ 11,175 
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(2) Respondent is awarded the 2004 Jeep Grand Cherokee 
which he purchased within the month prior to the divorce trial and which the Court finds has no 
equity. 
(3) Respondent is awarded the 1993 Ford F250 pickup truck 
at a marital value of $ 1,500. 
j . Personal Property The personal property if the parties is awarded in 
accordance with Respondent's Exhibit 21 and the lists attached thereto as follows with no values 
ascribed: 
(1) Petitioner is awarded items listed on Exhibit "A" which if in the 
possession of Respondent will be given to Petitioner, 
(2) Petitioner is awarded items listed on Exhibit "B" which are items 
she took with her and are currently in her possession; 
(3) Respondent is awarded items listed on Exhibit "C" which are 
currently in his possession except to the extent that any of those items are listed in Petitioner's 
requested items on Exhibit "A". 
(4) Respondent has the family photographs and Petitioner has 
the negatives up to the time of the parties' separation, and this was a fair division of these 
photographs, Respondent is ordered to provide Petitioner with copies of photos taken of the 
daughters of the parties since the separation to the time of trial. 
6. The division of marital property between the parties as set forth above is as 
follows: 
5 
JOSEPHINE 
1888 Spring Lane, Salt Lake City, UT 
House to be listed and sold and proceeds divided after 
payment of mortgage, sales commission and closing costs, 
accrued property taxes, and reimbursement to Respondent 
for mortgage payments made from the time of separation 
to the time of sale with the remainder to be divided 
equally. 
One-half One-half 
BUSINESS INTEREST 
Schovaers Electronics, 116 shares 
Schovaers Investments 
BANK AND INVESTMENT ACCOUNTS 
Treasury Credit Union #1424 (Josephine) 
Bank of America #69907749 (Josephine) 
US Bank, checking #153150249339 (John) 
Paine Webber #FP 1481432 (Joint) 
US Bank #253100058986 (Custodial account for Anna) 
Schwab #4134-8210 
(Custodial account for Aundrea and Anna) 
RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS (Divide all by QDRO) 
Utah Retirement Systems 401(k) (Josephine) 
Utah Retirement Systems, Defined Benefit Plan 
(Josephine) 
Paine Webber IRA (Josephine) 
Schovaers Electronics Profit Sharing Plan (John) 
Paine Webber IRA #FP 1453332 (John) 
One-half 
One-half 
One-half 
One-half 
One-half 
One-half 
One-half 
One-half 
One-half 
One-half 
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JOSEPHINE JOHN 
LEE INSURANCE 
Jackson National Life #0017206120 (no cash value) — 
PERSONAL PROPERTY AND MISCELLANEOUS 
2004 Jeep Grand Cherokee (John) -0-
Financed 100%; no equity 
1999 Jeep Grand Cherokee Laredo 4WD (Josephine) 11,175 
Value per NADA trade-in 
1993 Ford Truck F250 - Salvage value only 1,500 
Furniture and furnishings (divided per Exhibit 21) Divided Divided 
Credit for mediation fee paid to Marcie Keck (680) 
TOTALS $11,175 $820 
($5,177) $5,177 
NET DISTRIBUTION $5,998 $5,997 
7. In order to equalize the property award between the parties, petitioner 
is ordered to pay to respondent $5,177, which shall be treated as a credit by respondent in the 
payment of his obUgation set forth in paragraph 5(e) above on the bank account, which will 
reduce that obligation to the net amount of $5,872 .and paid in the manner set forth in paragraph 
5(e). 
8. Petitioner is restored to her maiden name of McEntire and to be known 
hereafter as Josephine McEntire. 
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9. Each party is ordered to pay and be responsible for their own attorney's 
fees and costs incurred in the prosecution of this divorce action. 
8 
10. Each party is ordered to execute any documents and perform any acts 
necessary to effectuate the terms of this Decree of Divorce. 
DATED this day of October, 2003 
BY THE COURT: 
LESLIE LEWIS 
District Court Judge 
9 
RECEIVED 
FEB0620W 
Q
*t, ^damson « 0 o n o v a n 
Frank N. Call, (U.S.B. #6846) 
68 South Main Street, Suite 701 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Phone Number: (801) 532-9909 
Attorney for Petitioner, Josephine M. Schovaers 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JN & FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPHINE M. SCHOVAERS, ] 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. ] 
JOHN C SCHOVAERS ] 
Respondent. 
1 Petitioner's Opposition to Respondent's 
) Rule 52(b) Motion to Amend Findings 
) and Role 59(a) Motion for a New Trial 
) and Rale 59(E) Motion to Alter or 
l Amend Judgment 
I Case #014903735 
) Judge Leslie Lewis 
1 Commissioner Casey 
Petitioner, Josephine M. Schovaers ("Ms. Schovaers"), ty an(i through her attorney Frank 
N. Call, files this as her opposition to the Rule 52(b) Motion to Amend Findings and Rule 59(a) 
Motion for a New Trial and Rule 59(E) Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (the "Motions") that 
has been filed by the Respondent, John C. Schovaers ("Respondent"). 
OPPOSITION 
L RESPONDENT'S MOTION SHOULD BE DENIED BECAUSE THERE ARE NO 
GROUNDS JUSTIFYING A NEW TRIAL OR THE AMENDMENT OF THE 
COURT'S JUDGMENT. 
In his Motions, Respondent claims the Court should amended its judgment and rulings in 
this matter and/or grant Respondent a new trial because, when the Court issued its rulings, the 
Court did not have the benefit of Respondent's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law (hereinafter referred to as the '"Respondent's proposed Findings & Conclusions") which 
contained the rationale and support for Respondent's positions, particularly as they relate to 
alimony. Motions, p.3. Respondent's assertion that the Court did not have or consider 
Respondent's proposed Findings & Conclusions when making its decision in this case is based 
solely on the feet that f2 of the Court's Memorandum Decision instructs Ms. Schovaers to 
amended her proposed findings and conclusions so as to incorporate "paragraph 5(a)" of 
Respondent's proposed Findings & Conclusions, but the findings of feet section of Respondent's 
proposed Findings & Conclusions does not have a paragraph numbered "5(a)," and f 5 of findings 
of feet section of the Respondent's proposed Findings & Conclusions relate to matters other than 
the allocation and division of the parties' home or real property. Motions* p.2. 
For the reasons set forth below, Respondent's claim and arguments are without merit and v 
<v \
 r 
appear to be nothing more than an attempt by Respondent to reargue and contest the Court's > ^i/' 
rulings. First, and most importantly, the Court's Memorandum Decision clemly md expressly jf* < 
states that the Court received Respondent's proposed Findings & Conclusions on about \ 
September 30,2003 and that the Court had "carefully considered" both party's respective 
proposed findings and conclusions before issuing its ruling on October 30,2003. Memorandum 
Decision, p.l. Thus, Respondent's assertion that the Court did not have or consider 
Respondent's proposed Findings & Conclusions when making its decision is directly contrary to 
the Court's own express statement that the Court had in feet received and considered 
Respondent's proposed Findings & Conclusions before making its decision in this matter. Since 
-2-
the Court has already expressly stated that it had received and considered Respondent's proposed 
Findings & Conclusions before making its decision, the Court should deny the Respondent's 
Motions. 
Next, f2 of the Court's Memorandum Decision states and reads as follows: 
The petitioner discusses the parties' house and real property at 1888 Spring Lane, 
Salt Lake City, Utah in Findings Nos. 33 through 41. The petitioner is to re-draft 
these Findings first to simplify them and second, to incorporate paragraph 5(a) of 
the respondent's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, The Court 
concludes that the respondent's version in this respect is the more accurate version 
of the Court's ruling on the house and the division of the proceeds upon sale of the 
house. [Petitioner's] Conclusions of Law should be similarly edited. (Emphasis 
added). 
Although it is true that f5 of the findings of feet section of Respondent's proposed Findings & 
Conclusions does not address the division of the parties' house or real property, ^ [5 of the 
conclusions of law section of the Respondent's proposed Findings & Conclusions specifically 
address the division of the parties' house and real property as described in <p of the Court's 
Memorandum Decision. Thus, it is abundantly clear that the Court's reference to "paragraph 5(a) 
of the respondent's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" is a reference to ^ 5 of the 
tj-
conclusions of law portion of the Respondent's proposed Findings & Conclusions. I r y 
When re-drafting and editing Ms. Schovaers' proposed findings as directed by the Court, counsel ?*r { 
for Ms. Schovaers had no difficulty linking the Court's reference to paragraph 5(a)" of 
Respondent's proposed Findings & Conclusions to those provisions of Respondent's proposed 
Findings & Conclusions that the Court wanted to utilize in allocating and dividing the parties' 
house and real property. 
Thus, it is abundantly clear that the Court did in feet have access to Respondent's 
proposed Findings & Conclusions when it made its decision and rulings in this matter. Moreover, 
^2 of the Court's Memorandum Decision show tkiLT nut only did -aej^oigtjbaye Respondent's 
proposed Findings & Conclusions when making its decision, the Court actually used and adopted 
some of the provisions from Respondent's proposed Findings and Conclusions in making its 
decision in this matter. Since the basis for Respondent's Motions is without merit, the Court 
should deny Respondent's Motions. 
DL THE COURT SHOULD DENY RESPONDENTS MOTIONS BECAUSE THE 
COURT'S ALIMONY AWARD AND OTHfiR RULINGS ARE LEGAL AND 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
In his Motions, Respondent seeks a new trial and/or the amended of the judgment 
pursuant to Rule 59(a)(6) and (7) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Motions, p. 1. In 
essence, Respondent claims that, since he only earns $4,300 per month, the Court's alimony 
award of $2,000 per month is not adequately supported by the evidence and/or is illegal 
Motions, p,3-7. Respondent's assertion in this regard fails to recognize and properly apply the 
applicable binding case law and statutory provisions that relate to alimony awards. 
In Utah divorce cases, trial courts must consider three factors before awarding alimony. 
Those factors include: (1) the financial needs and condition of the recipient spouse; (2) the ability 
of the recipient spouse to provide a sufficient income for herself; and (3) the ability of the payor 
spouse to provide support. E.g., Bakanowski v. Bakahowski 80 P.3d 153,155 (Ut. App. 2003). 
Here, the Court adequately considered all of these factors in determining to award alimony of 
$2,000 per month to Ms. Schovaers. Respondent now challenges the Court's alimony award and 
argues that the alimony award is necessarily illegal and unjustified because $2,000 is not available 
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from the Respondent's monthly salary of $4,300.00 per month. Thus, the thrust of Respondent's 
argument is that when looking solely at his employment income, Respondent does not have the 
ability to provide support to Ms. Schovaers. Respondent's analysis and argument is flawed for 
several reasons. 
First, when determining whether a payor has the ability to pay alimony, the Court must 
consider, not only the payor's income from employment, but all financial resources that the payor 
can use to pay alimony, including the payor's separate property. E.g., Sampinos v. Sampinos, 
750 P.2d 615,618-619 (Ut. App. 1988). Here, Respondent asks the Court to focus only on the 
feet that his monthly income is $4,300 per month, and to completely ignore the fact that the 
Respondent has significant other financial resources from which he can pay alimony including: 
hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of the Schovaers Electronics stock; hundreds of 
thousands of dollars worth of retirement benefits; other property; as well as regular monetary gifts 
and/or payments from parents. Respondent's argument that his ability to pay alimony should be 
determined by considering only his $4,300 monthly employment income is contrary to Sampinos 
v. Sampinos and all of the other Utah cases that instruct trial courts to consider, not only the 
payor's income from employment, but the payor's total financial circumstances when determining 
the proper amount of alimony awards. Here, it is clear that the Court properly considered the 
Respondent's total financial circumstances when deciding its alimony award. Thus, in light of 
Respondent's total financial circumstances, the alimony award is neither excessive or improper. 
Next, even though the Court previously indicated that the Respondent had grossly 
overstated his claimed expenses, Respondent continues to wilfully overstate his expenses in 
-5-
arguing that the alimony award is excessive. In particular, Anna, the parties' minor child is now 
18 years old and will be fully emancipated in less than 4 months. Once Anna is fully emancipated, 
Respondent's claimed expenses will be significantly reduced even ftirther. Anna's pending 
emancipation and the feet that Respondent's claimed expenses would soon be reduced even 
further was clearly considered and known to the Court both at the time of trial and when the 
Court determined the appropriate amount alimony. Nevertheless, Respondent's Motions fail to 
acknowledge or even acknowledge the feet that Respondent's claimed expenses will be 
significantly reduced in less than 4 months. Thus, the Respondent's analysis and argument that 
the alimony award is improper or excessive in light of his expenses is flawed and significantly 
overstated. 
Next, Respondent argues that the Court's alimony award is excessive and improper 
because the $2,000 monthly alimony award does not equalize the parties' respective monthly 
incomes, but instead puts the Respondent's net monthly income lower than Petitioner's. Motion, 
p.6. The Respondent's argument in this regard is improper and misconstrues the case law 
because the goal and purpose of alimony is not to equalize the parties' income. Instead, the 
purpose and goal of alimony is to equalize the parties' standards of living and restore the payee as 
close as possible to the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage. E.g., Bakanowski v. 
BakanowskL 80 P.3d 153,154 (Ut App. 2003) ("It is well within the Court's equitable powers to 
order alimony in an amount sufficient to equalize the parties1 standards of living."); Williamson v. 
Williamson. 983 P.2d 1103,1106 (Ut App. 1999) (4The goal of alimony [is] to equalize the 
parties' standards of living, not just their incomes"). Here, the Court's alimony award properly 
equalizes the parties' standards of living rather than their respective net monthly incomes. Any 
assertion by the Respondent that the Court's alimony award must equalize the parties' incomes is 
-6-
directly contrary to all cases dealing with the matter. Kg.. Kemp v. Kemp, 2001UT App 157 
("We have never required [equalization] of income." 
In light of the foregoing, it is apparent that the Court considered all of the factors its was 
obligated to considered when deciding on the amount of alimony to award. The Court's alimony 
award is both proper and reasonable in amount as it fairly equalizes the parties' standards of living 
and returns Ms. Schovaers, as close as equitably possible, to the standard of living that she 
enjoyed during the course of the parties' marriage. Furthermore, the Court considered 
Respondent's total financial circumstances when determining his ability to pay support. Thus, the 
Court's alimony award is both consistent with the law and adequately supported by the evidence. 
Accordingly, Respondent's Motions should be denied. 
Dated: Z> 04 
Frank N. Call 
Attorney for Petitioner, Josephine M. Schovaers 
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PROOF OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this JTH day of \1ZfflltJ&M , 2004,1 caused a true and 
accurate copy of the forgoing to be served on the persons listed below by mailing such copies by 
U.S. First Class mail, postage pre-paid, to: 
Bert L. Dart 
Dart Adamson & Donovan 
Attorney for John Schovaers 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
B.L. DART (818) 
DART ADAMSON & DONOVAN 
Attorney for Respondent 
370 East South Temple, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
(801)521-6383 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
---oooOOOooo— 
JOSEPHINE M.SCHOVAERS, : RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO 
PETITIONER'S OPPOSITION TO 
Petitioner, : RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO AMEND 
FINDINGS, MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
v. : & MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND 
JUDGMENT 
JOHN C. SCHOVAERS, : 
Civil No. 014903735 
Respondent : 
Judge Leslie Lewis 
—oooOOOooo— 
Respondent, John C. Schovaers, by bis attorney, B. L. Dart, replies to petitioner's 
Opposition to respondent's Motion to Amend Findings, Motion for New Trial and Motion to 
Alter or Amend Judgment as follows: 
1. The first point of petitioner's Opposition is based upon the claim that the 
Court must have had respondent's Findings of Fact when it made its ruling because in the 
Memorandum Decision it referenced respondent's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The 
problem is that the reference was to paragraph 5(a) of the proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and there, in fact, is no paragraph 5(a) to those proposed Findings. The only 
paragraph 5(a) of respondent's pleadings is of the proposed Decree of Divorce. There is a 
paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fact but it relates to monthly expenses, not to property. 
Petitioner then contends that the reference by the court to paragraph 5(a) 
was as to the property award and then goes on to say, 
"Thus, it is abundantly clear that the court's reference to 'paragraph 
5(a) of the respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law' is a reference to paragraph 5 of the Conclusions of Law 
portion of the respondent's Proposed Findings and Conclusions." 
This position makes no sense as the Memorandum Decision directed petitioner to "incorporate 
paragraph 5(a) of the respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law." 
Paragraph 5 of respondent's proposed Conclusions of Law states, "The property of the parties 
shall be awarded set forth in paragraphs 14 and 15 of the Findings of Fact" It is difficult to see 
how the Court would have asked petitioner to incorporate this language into his Findings of Fact 
The language of the court directing petitioner to incorporate paragraph 
5(a) of the respondent's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law only makes sense 
when it is applied to paragraph 5 of respondent's Proposed Decree of Divorce and this is why it is 
submitted that the Court was relying upon respondent's Proposed Decree of Divorce and not his 
Proposed Findings of Fact at the time it made its ruling. 
It is clear the Court was looking at the respondent's Proposed Decree of 
Divorce, which does not incorporate all of the bases for the various rulings and not respondent's 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, which does incorporate the basis for the 
proposed rulings, by looking at the language from the Memorandum Decision that states, 
"The petitioner filed her Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law on approximately September 16,2003. The respondent 
submitted his Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
approximately September 30,2003." 
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As can be seen from Exhibits "A" and "IT attached to respondent's Motion, respondent's 
Findings of Fact were delivered to the Court on the 12th of September, 2003. Respondent's 
Proposed Decree of Divorce was delivered to the Court on the 30th day of September, 2003. It is 
obvious the Court was looking at the Proposed Decree of Divorce. 
Finally, petitioner claims that the Court must have had the respondent's 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law when making its decision as, "The court 
actually used and adopted some of the provisions from respondent's Proposed Findings and 
Conclusions in making its decision in this matter," and references the Court to paragraph 2 of the 
Memorandum Decision. There is nothing in paragraph 2 of the Memorandum Decision to 
establish that the Court was looking at respondent's Proposed Findings as opposed to the 
Proposed Decree of Divorce. 
2. The only cash flow available to respondent is his monthly salary which the 
Court found to be $4,300 a month. Petitioner in her brief contends that in determining whether 
respondent had the ability to pay alimony, the Court should consider not only his income from 
employment but all financial resources that he could use to pay alimony, including his separate 
property and cites the Court to the case of Sampinos v. Sampinos. 750 P.2d 615,618-619. The 
Sampinos case is not applicable to the facts of this case as in the Sampinos case the Court found 
that the plaintiflTwife, 
"while married to defendant was forced to use her inheritance 
proceeds from the sale of her home for support and maintenance, 
a portion of which was used for defendant's benefit. We, therefore, 
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding 
plaintiff alimony from the coal contract proceeds, even though the 
trial court determined them to be defendant's sold and separate 
property." 
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In the Sampinos case the Court found that where plaintiffs non-marital assets had been used to 
support defendant it was appropriate to use an income stream off of defendant's non-marital 
assets to assist him in paying alimony. Those are not the facts of this case. No assets of 
petitioner have been used to support respondent and respondent has no assets which provide an 
income stream. The Schovaers Electronics stock which is referred to by petitioner has never paid 
any dividends and does not provide any income stream to respondent. 
Petitioner then claims that respondent has "hundreds of thousands of 
dollars worth of retirement benefits" which he can look to in paying alimony, while disregarding 
the fact that the retirement of the parties was divided equally between the parties and petitioner 
has the same amount of funds from this source as does respondent Finally, petitioner mentions 
that respondent has regular monetary gifts from his parents. Respondent testified that that gifting 
from his parents had terminated based upon the changes of tax laws that allow larger estates to 
pass free of inheritance taxes. More important, respondent's attorney has never known of a case 
where a court has based alimony award on anticipated gifts from the payor's parents. 
Petitioner then makes the argument that the goal of alimony is to equalize 
the parties' standard of living not just their incomes and, in so doing, cites the Court to the case of 
Williamson v. Williamson. 983 P.2d 1103 (Utah App. 1999). The Williamson case has no 
application here. The Williamson case was a case where in a modification proceeding the trial 
court terminated a $425 a month alimony award under circumstances that the husband's income 
had been reduced from $3,550 a month at the time of the divorce to $2,090 a month at the time of 
the modification hearing. The trial court ruling was reversed for failure of the trial court to 
prepare sufficient Findings of Fact to support his ruling. The statement that the goal of alimony is 
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to equalize the parties' standard of living not just their incomes was in the context that the 
husband had remarried. The Court in its opinion stated, 
"When considering Ms. Williamson's financial condition 
and earning capacity and Mr. Williamson's ability to give 
support, the trial court should move beyond merely 
considering their incomes and inquiry more fully into 
their financial situations including Mr. Williamson's new 
spouses financial ability to share living expenses with him." 
In the Schovaers case it is difficult to see how the parties can have an equal 
standard of living if they have a disparate level of income. The Memorandum Decision of the 
Court unfortunately does create a disparate situation to Mrs. Schovaers's advantage and to Mr. 
Schovaers's disadvantage. There was nothing in this case to indicate that petitioner's expenses 
were higher than respondent's. In fact, the reverse is true. 
Petitioner relies on the Kemp case to say that the Court has never required 
equalization of income. In the Kemp case the Court determined that there was a $560 difference 
between the wife's earning capacity and her reasonable expenses and, therefore, awarded $560 a 
month in alimony. The wife, who was the recipient of alimony, was asking the Court to equalize 
income under circumstances where all of her expenses had been covered under the alimony award. 
An equalization of income would have created a cash flow to the wife in excess of her needs. 
Under all of the circumstances of this case, the Court should modify its 
award of alimony for the reasons set forth in respondent's Motion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 20th day o^Fe^ary, 200/ . / / / 
B. L. DART 
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I hereby certify that on the 20* day of February, 2004,1 mailed a copy of the 
foregoing to: 
Frank N. Call 
Attorney for Petitioner 
68 South Main Street, #701 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
mmz. KJMJ 
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